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One of the most common anecdotal criticisms to private equity (“PE”) activity is that 
they cut myopically capital expenditures. Notwithstanding the fact that it is relatively 
clear that investments do fall after the buyout, it is far from answered the question on 
whether this results from underinvestment or, alternatively, overinvestment - a 
correction of an agency problem. Until recently, this has remained an understudied 
subject in the literature, with an overinvestment correction hypothesis being implicitly 
adopted, conditioned by the focus of research on US public-to-private deals and the lack 
of private firms financial data in US keeping the debate on overinvestment of public 
over private firms, opposing Jensen (1989) to Stein (1988), mainly on a theoretical 
ground. Only more recently, this hypothesis started to be questioned with Sousa and 
Jenkinson (2013), Bharath et al. (2014) and Ughetto (2014) concluding that evidence is, 
at least, not supportive of an overinvestment explanation. At the same time, a recent US 
study (Asker et al., 2015) also disputes the idea that public firms overinvest their private 
counterparts. We analyse a sample of 92 PE entry deals that took place in Europe 
between 2006 and 2010. We also compare a sample of 29 thousand European public 
and private companies, during the last decade. We find some evidence, even though 
limited, that PE impact negatively firms investment policies due to a mix of increased 
financial constraints and probably to lower sensitivity to investment opportunities. In 
any case, we found stronger evidence that the overinvestment correction is hardly a 
valid explanation, as public firms, at least before the crisis, clearly invested less than 
their private counterparts, under all matching criteria, and controlling for investment 
opportunities and cash-flow. Under some specific matching criterion, they still did after 
the crisis.   
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Uma crítica frequente ao capital de risco (“CR”) é a de cortarem o investimento de 
forma cega. Embora seja relativamente consensual que o investimento cai após a 
aquisição, encontra-se por responder se isso resulta de subinvestimento ou antes de 
sobreinvestimento (custos de agência). Até recentemente, a questão permaneceu 
negligenciada na Literatura, com a hipótese sobreinvestimento a ser implicitamente 
aceite, em parte pelo facto de a investigação ser centrada em transações de aquisição de 
empresas cotadas nos EUA e devido à falta de dados financeiros de empresas não 
cotadas nesse país, determinando que o debate sobre se as empresas cotadas investem 
mais ou menos, opondo Jensen (1989) a Stein (1988), se mantivesse teórico. Apenas 
recentemente, a hipótese de sobreinvestimento começou a ser questionada, com Sousa 
and Jenkinson (2013), Bharath et al. (2014) e Ughetto (2014) a concluírem que a 
evidência, não é favorável àquela explicação. Asker et al. (2015) apresentou também 
nova evidência que contesta a ideia de que as empresas cotadas investem mais que as 
não cotadas nos EUA. Analisámos uma amostra de 92 transações de aquisição de 
empresas por CR, entre 2006 e 2010, e uma amostra de 29 mil empresas cotadas e não 
cotadas Europeias, nos últimos 10 anos. Encontramos alguma evidência, embora 
limitada, de que entrada de CR impacta negativamente a política de investimento das 
empresas, devido a uma combinação de aumento de restrições financeiras e menor 
sensibilidade às oportunidades de investimento. Em todo o caso, encontramos evidência 
significativa de que a hipótese de correção de sobreinvestimento dificilmente será uma 
explicação válida, tendo em conta que as empresas cotadas, pelo menos antes da crise, 
investiam menos que os pares não cotados, em todos os critérios de formação de pares e 
controlando as oportunidades de investimento e a rentabilidade. Sob determinado 
critério, essa situação continuou mesmo depois da crise.  
 
Palavras-chave: capital de risco, investimento, despesas de capital. 
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In the late 80’s, as the first private equity (“PE”) wave neared its end, Jensen (1989), in 
a seminal article, argued that leveraged buyouts (“LBO”) would emerge as a permanent 
and superior form of organization, “eclipsing” public corporations.   
Rappaport (1990) presented an opposite view, by considering LBOs a “cul-de sac”, due 
to its self-limited nature, whose benefits, in terms of governance and agency costs 
mitigation, could be matched by a permanent organization, the public corporation, 
through other means.  
The first significant empirical research on the subject was provided by Kaplan (1989), 
who concluded that PE create value through LBOs, following significant improvements 
in operating performance.  
Other studies backed this overall conclusion. In one of the most recent and 
comprehensive studies Guo et al. (2011) concluded that albeit that there are still some  
improvements in operating performance of PE backed firms, they had, somehow, 
reduced significantly during the second wave (late 90’s onwards).   
In addition to the operating performance improvement, the studies also reported that 
capital expenditures (“CAPEX”) typically fell after the buyout. This fact can be 
consistent with two contradicting hypothesis (Wright et al., 2009): (1) post-buyout firms 
are cash constrained and underinvest; and (2) the buyout governance structure induces 
managers to reduce capital expenditures that are non value maximising. 
While the latter would be a confirmation of Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis, the 
former could have some significant implications on the long term value of PE activity, 
as an “artificially” lower CAPEX, to boost the buyout deleveraging and, thus, ensure to 
the PE investor a higher return, could hamper the long term performance of the firm.  
The question is, however, far from being straightforward. First, it is difficult to assess 
whether a firm is postponing, or not, positive net present value (“NPV”) investments, as 
the investment level data is hardly available. Second, the interpretation of the effect of 
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financial constraints on investment is not completely free from discussion in the 
literature.  
The more or less consensual evidence that CAPEX falls after the PE entry, was early 
interpreted explicitly by Kaplan (1989), and implicitly since then, as a sign of a 
correction of overinvestment due to free cash-flow / agency problems (Jensen, 1986).  
This tacit assumption was somehow conditioned by the fact that a significant proportion 
of the empirical research was focused on public-to-private deals and, as research is 
prone to be US centric, the lack of private firms financial data has kept debate on the 
overinvestment of public over private firms, opposing Jensen (1989) to Stein (1988) -
who claimed that public firms cut myopically investments due to short terms pressures - 
mainly on a theoretical ground.  
Hence, until recently, the impact of PE activities in firms’ investment policies has been 
somehow a neglected topic, despite the fact that this is one of the most common 
anecdotal criticisms to PE activity - the fact that they allegedly cut myopically CAPEX.   
Only more recently, the overinvestment correction hypothesis started to be questioned, 
as for the typical study (US/UK, large companies) evidence started to mount up that 
there may be some flaws to the free cash flow hypothesis in explaining CAPEX 
behaviour. Sousa and Jenkinson (2013), Bharath et al. (2014) and Ughetto (2014) have 
concluded that there is some evidence that supports the underinvestment of PE firms or, 
at least, that evidence is not supportive of an overinvestment explanation.  
More recently, focusing on the public vs. private firm debate, Asker et al. (2015), 
building on an exclusive and new US private firm database, showed that, in the US, 
public firms invest less and are less sensitive to changes in investment opportunities 
than private firms, even during the recent financial crisis, when private firms most 
probably became more financially constrained than their public counterparts.  
This dissertation seeks to explore this thematic, incorporating and combining some of 
the early approaches (Kaplan, 1989) with the most recent contributions from the 
literature, namely by adapting Asker et al. (2015) methodology to the PE context.  
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Using data collected from Zephyr and Amadeus databases, we analysed a sample of 92 
European PE entry deals, that took place from 2006 to 2010, and c. 29 thousand 
European public and private firms, during the last decade, with a twofold research goal.  
First, we tried to assess the impact of PE entry in European companies during the last 
decade, answering the question on whether PE backed firms cut myopically 
investments, by comparing to its matched peers and controlling for variables commonly 
used in the empirical investment literature to explain investment intensity.    
Second, we also try to compare public to private firms investment policies, in order to 
compare to Asker et al. (2015) results for US with Europe, and verify empirically the 
question of public firm overinvestment (Jensen, 1986) vs. underinvestment (Stein, 1988) 
hypothesis.  
Both goals are related, as the common explanation for the investment intensity 
reduction after the buyout is exactly the correction of overinvestment.  
In a sample deeply marked by the financial crisis, which severely penalizes the 
statistical significance of our results, we found limited evidence that investment of PE 
backed firms falls below its peers, even after controlling for the variables that explain it.  
This is only visible in a specific investment intensity metric and in relation to a certain 
matching criterion, sector and return on assets (“ROA”), under which it is also possible 
to conclude that, after the PE entry, firms become less sensitive to investment 
opportunities.  
For example, by year 3 after de PE buyout the PE firms’ investment intensity is lower 
than its matched peers by sector and ROA in -2.2 pp and -10.6 pp, for CAPEX/Lag total 
assets, CAPEX/sales, respectively. For the same matching criterion, the PE firm has 
CAPEX/Lag total assets lower in 1.28 pp (sig. 10%) than its peers, holding investment 
opportunities and profitability constant.  
However, the fact that after PE entry firms become more financially constrained is quite 
more robust to several specifications and samples. The critiques to investment cash flow 
(“ICF”) sensitivities interpretation relates to the fact if they should, or not, be 
considered a measure of the degree of financial constraints but do not apply to the 
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interpretation of a sign of its existence: financially constrained firms would have 
positive and significant ICF sensitivities (Bertoni et al., 2013). In our sample only PE 
firms show positive statistically significant ICF sensitivities in the post buyout period.  
In any case, we found stronger evidence that European public firms invest less, 
controlling investment opportunities and profitability, than private counterparts, under a 
specific matching criterion (sector and ROA) or, at least they did before the crisis, under 
all criteria. Although there are some differences, our results are broadly in line with in 
Asker et al. (2015) findings. 
Interestingly, the disappearance of the public firm underinvestment with the crisis, 
under some matching criteria, seems consistent with a higher ICF sensitivity from 
private firms, which as of common knowledge, have less access to capital markets and, 
thus, probably became much more dependent on their internal financing sources, as 
with the crisis the banking system financing availability shrunk.  
This, of course, lacks further investigation, but seems also consistent with the fact that 
the only period where unconstrained investment intensities become higher in public 
firms than in (matched) private ones is during the start of the crisis period (2007/08), 
and happens not because public firms increase their investment but because private 
firms dramatically shrunk their CAPEX.     
We also find possible that the different financing structure on the US and European 
firms, with the former much less dependent on the banking system, can be a clue to 
explain the differences from our results to ones found in Asker et al. (2015). 
Besides this section, this report is structured as follows: in section 2 we review the 
literature on the topic; in section 3 we discuss the methodological aspects of our study; 
in section 4 we present our empirical findings regarding our sample of 92 European PE 
large (>€50m) deals (entries) in the 2006/10 period; in section 5 we present a 
comparison between public and private firms and; finally in section 6 we present our 




2. Literature Review 
2.1. The role of Private Equity – early theoretical discussion 
Jensen (1989), in a seminal article, argued that LBOs would emerge as a permanent and 
superior form of organization, “eclipsing” pubic corporations.   
Building on his earlier concept of the disciplining role of debt as a mitigator of agency 
costs raised by free cash flow (Jensen, 1986),  the author argued that together with the 
leveraged (more efficient) capital structure, LBOs enjoyed a concentrated ownership, 
resulting in closer monitoring of the managers and stronger managerial incentives.  
These unique features, he argued, enabled LBO managers to add value more effectively, 
otherwise wasted by public corporations, which could be glimpsed by the 50% average 
premium paid (at the time) in LBOs.  
On the opposite side, Rappaport (1990) argued LBOs were an economic “cul-de sac”, 
due to the self-limited nature: by design, LBOs are a transitory organization, as the 
limited-partnership agreements provide ten-year duration for the partnership. Thus, in 
order to maximize returns, the sponsor needs to generate cash from operations and 
divestitures to reduce debt toward pre-buyout levels, in order to cash-out, either by 
returning the company to public markets by selling it to a strategic buyer. 
At most, he argues, the LBO is a short term “shock therapy”, but whose benefits in 
terms of governance and agency costs mitigation could be matched by a permanent 
organization, the public corporation, by other means.  
2.2. Empirical Analysis to PE firm-level operating impact 
In the same year that Jensen (1989) made his proposition, Kaplan (1989) produced the 
first comprehensive insight on the firm-level impact of PE activity
1
. By analysing 76 
large management buyouts (“MBOs”), between 1980 and 1986, and comparing 
operating income and cash flow variables evolution 1 year pre-buyout with up to 3 
                                                             
1 The author refers the study as the first to use pre buy-out as well as post buyout data. 
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years after buyout, controlling for divestures, differences in growth, and industry, he 
found that buyout firms significantly outperform non-buyout firms
2
. 
The author analysed the causes of this outperformance and tested three hypotheses: (i) 
employee-wealth-transfer hypothesis; (ii) information-advantage or underpricing 
hypothesis; (iii) reduced agency cost or new incentive hypothesis. The author concludes 
that evidence points to the fact that the operating improvements are generated by 
incentives rather than wealth transfers from employees or superior managerial 
information. 
Since then, while mainly focused in US and UK, several studies analysed the operating 
impact of PE in the buyout firms, and found consistently overall results. Strömberg 
(2009) provides a useful summary of related studies and findings.  
We believe it’s worth highlighting Guo et al. (2011), due to both its breadth and 
comparability
3
 with Kaplan (1989). The authors analysed the operating performance 
and value creation on the second PE wave, by studying a sample of 192 LBOs, spanning 
from 1990 to 2006.  
They found that, unlike what was documented in relation to the first wave, gains in 
operating performance are comparable, or, at best, slightly higher than those observed 
on industry (and matched pre-buyout characteristics), depending on the measure
4
.  
Besides the studies on operating performance impact, several other studies have been 
focusing on several specific issues
5
.  
                                                             
2
 For example, operating income (EBITDA) in buyout firms increased a median 15.3%, 30.7% and 42%, 
in years +1, +2 and +3 after the buyout, when comparing to pre-buyout year, significant at 1% level.  The 
difference to median industry change was -2.7%, +0.7% and 24.1%, also significant, meaning that the 
buyout firm performance is more or less the same as the industry in the first two years after the buyout, 
but in the third year clearly t outperforms its non buyout peers. Similar results were found in net cash 
flow (EBITDA-CAPEX), and in these two variables as a percentage of sales and assets. 
3 Both in terms of certain methodologies used as well as the direct comparison the authors make several 
times along the text.  
4 For example, the industry-adjusted changes - comparable to prior research – both for EBITDA to sales 
and net cash flow to sales do not show any major gains. Using the industry performance and market-to-
book-adjusted change, there they found a significant increase from year −1 to year +1 or +2 for both 
EBITDA to sales and net cash flow to sales. Still, even in these cases, the magnitudes are substantially 
smaller than reported by Kaplan (1989). 
5 Gilligan and Wright (2012) provide useful Tables with main research articles on several PE related 
subjects. Wood and Wright (2009) also provide an extensive compilation of the studies on the effect on 
employment and wages. 
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2.3. The Case for Investments 
One of the least studied aspects of PE impact regards investments. However, if we split 
investments in to two strands, the research and development (“R&D”) expenditures, 
usually referred to as a proxy to long-term investments, and capital expenditures, the 
results and challenges posed by the existing research are quite different.  
We’ll forgo R&D expenditures, on the back of, among other considerations, the 
different accounting treatments under different GAAP, which can make an analysis 
based on several countries complex.  Nonetheless, we believe it’s worth briefly 
mentioning the main conclusions regarding R&D. 
2.3.1. R&D Expenditures   
R&D expenditures are more studied than capital expenditures. However there seems to 
be fewer consensuses on the outcome.  
Studying 131 LBOs between 1981 and 1986, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) found data 
inconclusive regarding the impact on R&D. First, firms involved in LBOs were much 
less R&D intensive (mean R&D to sales 1%) than other firms (3.5%) before the LBO. 
Second, the difference is larger in the three years after than in the three years before the 
buyout. However, the change in these differences was not statistically significant. Third, 
the relative R&D intensity of LBO firms appears to have been declining in the years 
before the buyout, despite not statistically significant. 
Long and Ravenscraft (1993) confirm that LBOs target significantly below normal 
R&D intensive firms. Pre-LBO R&D to sales is less than half the overall manufacturing 
average. Nevertheless some LBOs did occur in high tech industry, as the large variance 
in R&D intensity among LBO firms denoted.  
Unlike Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), however, they found a significant and dramatic 
decline in R&D intensity as a result of the buyout: 40%. Still, they also find that the 
declines in R&D intensity do not appear to hurt the ability of LBOs to generate 
performance gains. On average, LBOs improve operating performance by 15 percent or 
more. Cutbacks in R&D have no statistically significant effect on performance. 
According to one of the estimated equations, for a typical R&D intensity cut of 0.63, 
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performance would decline by 0.19, which is only about 10% of the 2.06 increase in 
cash flow/sales. 
The theoretical foundations the authors present to indicate the reduction in R&D was 
expectable after the LBO are more or less in line with Hall et al. (1990), who 
established a clear relationship between leverage and reduced R&D spending. The 
authors argue that R&D could be an unintended victim of the trend to shift financing 
towards debt. 
Nevertheless, they considered they were unable to demonstrate that the projects that 
were eliminated in LBO restructurings were worthwhile (high social or private returns).  
In a more recent work, Lerner et al. (2011) criticised R&D expenditures as a measure 
for long term investment in innovation. According to the authors, not all research 
expenditures are well spent, and some critics suggest that many corporate research 
activities are wasteful and yield a low return, making changes in R&D expenditures 
difficult to interpret. The authors used an alternative measure, patenting data, and found 
no evidence that PE backed firms changed their patenting origination pattern. 
Furthermore, they concluded that those firms become more cited. 
Against this idea, Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) identify a clear and significant 
relationship between R&D spending intensity and corporate value, although varying 
with size, for several sectors.  
Ughetto (2010) cites several other studies that support of the hypothesis that PE 
intervention is not detrimental to long-term investments in R&D and innovation. This 
author considered that the use of R&D expenditures or more direct measures of 
innovative output such as productivity growth might prove more useful, than patents, 
for a more complete assessment of the difficult task of measuring innovative effort.  
Nevertheless, the key takeaway from the author’s findings is the suggestion that 
evaluating all buyouts on the same performance metrics without taking into account the 
characteristics of the investors/deal may not be appropriate, as they seem to have some 
impact on the innovation performance of firms.  
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2.3.2. Capital Expenditures   
The question with capital expenditures is not whether the CAPEX falls after the buyout, 
or not, as there seems to be a relative consensus in this conclusion
6
.  
Albeit only few studies refer to CAPEX directly, this assessment can be drawn 
indirectly in most of the studies on the impact on operating performance, by comparing 
the conclusions on EBITDA versus net cash flow evolution, two variables commonly 
analysed. As it is usually observed net cash flow increasing more than EBITDA, and 
taking into account the difference between the variables is CAPEX, the assertion seems 
to be self explanatory.  
A summary of the main studies addressing the PE/CAPEX topic is provided in 
Appendix I.  
2.3.2.1. Overinvestment versus Underinvestment   
The real question is the fact that the CAPEX reduction can be consistent with two 
contradicting hypothesis, a underinvestment hypothesis and a overinvesting hypothesis, 
or, as Wright et al. (2009) describe it: (1) post-buyout firms are cash constrained and 
underinvest; and (2) the buyout governance structure induces managers to reduce capital 
expenditures that are non-value-maximising. 
While the latter would be a confirmation of Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis, the 
former could have some significant implications on the long term value of PE activity, 
as an “artificially” lower CAPEX, to boost the buyout deleveraging and, thus, ensure to 
the PE investor a higher return, could hamper the long term performance of the firm.  
The question is, however, far from being easy to answer. One of the reasons is that it is 
difficult to assess whether a firm is postponing, or not, positive NPV investments, as the 
investment-level data is hardly available. 
Kaplan (1989), analysing the evolution of market adjusted return to shareholders, 
concludes that as the MBO firms provide their shareholders with a higher return than 
                                                             
6 Exceptions made to Boucly et al. (2011) that found that in a sample of 839 French deals firms increase 




the market, there is indirect evidence that the reduced CAPEX was referring to value 
decreasing projects and, thus, the reduction increased the firm value.  
On the opposite direction, Sousa and Jenkinson (2013) show that PE backed firms 
exited through IPO increase much more the CAPEX than firms that exited through 
secondary buyouts (“SBO”). If the overinvestment hypothesis was right, and IPO firms 
started to invest in value decreasing projects, they shouldn’t be able to significantly and 
substantially outperform the market. 
As IPO firms invest more than firms than remain under PE hands, and the abnormal 
return suggests they invest in value increasing projects, this evidence, albeit indirect, 
seems to imply that PE backed firms do postpone value increasing investments.  
Interestingly, although not addressing the overinvestment/underinvestment discussion 
directly, some years before Holthausen and Larcker (1996) had already casted some 
doubts on the overinvestment correction, as a justification for the lower CAPEX in PE 
backed firms.  
They found that, for at least four years after the IPO, reverse LBO (“RLBO”) firms 
outperform their industries on an accounting basis performance but experience a 
performance decline. The authors also found that they spend significantly less than the 
“industry norm” on CAPEX in the year prior to the IPO, but this difference disappears 
afterwards. 
Furthermore, they found no relationship between the changes in CAPEX and leverage 
and managerial ownership. However, non-managerial insider ownership was found to 
be significantly and negatively related with changes in CAPEX. The results are not 
changed by including a variable to control for the IPO proceeds used to retire debt, as 
many firms explicitly indicate that they are going public in order to raise funds for 
increasing CAPEX. 
It is argued that if the RLBOs are constrained in their ability to make investments, their 
sample is unlikely to exhibit the positive incentive effects associated with debt as 
described by Jensen (1989), as those apply to firms with free cash flow generating 
ability and no profitable investment opportunities.  
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The authors considered the finding of an increased CAPEX after the RLBO as 
consistent with the firms being cash constrained before, in the case of the absence of an 
exogenous shock (for example a change in investment opportunities) to justify the 
behaviour.  
Chung (2011), analysing a UK buyout sample, suggests that the overinvestment 
correction only happens when the target is a public firm and when it’s a private firm the 
PE acts to increase value by reducing financial constraints.  
More recently, Bharath et al. (2014) analysed a considerable sample of going private 
(PE buyout, MBOs and operating firm) plant-level detail transactions, spanning from 
1981 to 2005.  
The authors found that, relative to control groups (industry-age-initial size groups), 
companies decrease CAPEX after going private, which suggests that public firms invest 
more than comparable private firms, and would traditionally be considered as a sign of 
overinvestment due to agency problems leading to “empire building”.  
However, they argue that if firms had been overinvesting, when they were public, they 
would have expected to see an improvement in productivity afterwards, but they found 
no such evidence, relative to control groups.  
In fact, they argue that going-private firms achieve the productivity improvements not 
by improving the productivity in individual plants but by selling the low productivity 
ones. They conclude the data does not support the overinvestment thesis.  
2.3.2.2. Investment Cash Flow Sensitivities  
The logic behind an underinvestment hypothesis is the fact that PE backed firms may 




                                                             
7 In fact it is common for LBO structures to have considerable and direct restrictions on CAPEX and 
acquisitions as well as maintenance covenants. See for instance the Loan Market Association 
(http://www.lma.eu.com/default.aspx) or S&P Loan market guide (https://www.lcdcomps.com/).  
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In fact, Achleitner and Figge (2014), found that financial buyouts (SBO) use 28–30% 
more leverage, measured in terms of Debt/EBITDA, than other buyouts, even after 
controlling for debt market conditions at the time of the transaction
8
. 
However, the relationship between financial constraints, cash flow and investment is not 
completely free from discussion in literature. 
In a seminal study on the subject, Fazzari et al. (1988) show there is a link between 
financial factors and investment decisions. The theoretical foundation for the research 
was the notion that unlike in Modigliani-Miller world, factors such as transaction costs, 
tax advantages, agency problems, costs of financial distress, and asymmetric 
information, make internal finance less costly than new shares or debt.  
The authors then argue that, under this reasoning, firms that pay higher dividends are 
less sensitive to variations in cash flow than firms that exhaust nearly all of their 
internal cash flows. 
This conclusion was challenged by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) who found firms with 
low dividends and that could invested if needed and were far from being cash 
constrained.  Fazzari et al. (2000) and Kaplan and Zingales (2000) continued the debate 
and Moyen (2004), in a tentative reconciliation approach, showed that the classification 
of a firm as under financial constraints is hard and results vary under different criteria. 
Nevertheless, investment-cash flow (ICF) sensitivities, in the logic of Fazzari et al. 
(1988), continue to be widely used by scholars as a theoretical framework.   
ICF sensitivity can be defined as the impact that variations in a measure of cash flow 
have in the investment intensity, and in the investment literature are usually the 
coefficient of a regression of an investment intensity measure (e.g. CAPEX/Total 
assets) against a measure of cash flow (commonly EBITDA/Total assets).  
Bertoni et al. (2013) suggest that ICF sensitivity should not be used as a direct signal of 
the severity of financial constraints but as an indicator of the existence of financial 
constraints: the ICF sensitivity will not be significantly different from zero for non-
                                                             
8  However, unlike Sousa and Jenkinson (2013) they found no robust evidence that financial buyouts have 
lower equity returns than other buyouts or offer less potential for operational performance improvements. 
These authors do not address the CAPEX issue. 
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financially constrained firms, but a positive and significant ICF sensitivity would 
indicate the existence of financial constraints. According to the authors, the Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) critique refers to the  monotonicity of the relationship  not about its 
sign. 
Using an ICF sensitivity approach, Engel and Stiebale (2014) analysed a sample of UK 
and French SME’s and concluded that PE enhance investment and reduce financial 
constraints.  
Interestingly, smaller deals, typically the ones that would capture SMEs, are usually 
excluded from the sample in most studies we reviewed, on the back of less disclosure 
and information availability. The authors refer to the fact that they believe SMEs are in 
general more cash constrained, which today is under a generalized public debate in 
Europe. This can determine a whole different logic behind the PE intervention and, 
hence, make the results less comparable to the other studies. 
The same reasoning can be applied to Chung (2011), as despite a broader sample, has a 
median deal value of £10m, for the private-to-private subsample, signalling that he 
captured a significant proportion of small companies, hence probably influencing his 
overall conclusion that in private-to-private deals the PE intervention alleviates 
financial constraints. 
Ughetto (2014) showed that the characteristics of the deal, namely jurisdiction, 
applicable law and of the lead PE investor can impact target firm’s investments and ICF 
sensitivities.  
Interestingly, this conclusion is highly coherent with the fact that the only studies, found 
in our review, that conclude for a positive impact in investment in PE backed firms, 
Boucly et al. (2011) and Engel and Stiebale (2014), relate to a particular market, 
France, and to a usually out of scope type of firms, SMEs.  
Regarding the French market, Ughetto (2014) also addresses its peculiarities in term of 
Legal System. This relates with a strand of the literature usually referred as “Law and 
Finance”, in which is shown the impact of the legal system in valuations – see for 
instance La Porta et al. (2002). 
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An additional difficulty, relating the ICF sensitivity approach, is the fact that a positive 
ICF sensitivity can be viewed both as a underinvestment or a overinvestment symptom, 
depending on whether you accept Myers and Majluf (1984) asymmetrical information 
hypothesis or Jensen (1986) agency / free cash flow theory.  
In fact, if we believe that the asymmetrical information will lead to an inflated external 
funds cost, the positive ICF sensitivity will lead the firm to pass on positive NPV 
projects and, thus, underinvest. On the other hand, if we believe that in managers’ mind 
internal funds are too inexpensive, the agency / free cash flow hypothesis, they will tend 
to overinvest.  
However, if ICF sensitivity typically leads to overinvestment, then as managerial 
ownership increases, this sensitivity should decrease, as agency related issues started to 
disappear. Nevertheless, an initial finding of Morck et al. (1988) showed that 
managerial ownership has an “entrenchment effect” from a certain level and, thus, does 
not vary monotonically.  
Hadlock (1998) built a non linear model between management ownership and ICF 
sensitivities which deals with the “entrenchment”9 effect. The author concludes that his 
findings are consistent with asymmetric-information problems (hence, the 
underinvestment interpretation) becoming more severe as managers care more about 
shareholder value, which is backed by the fact that the relationship between ownership 
and ICF sensitivities is strongest for the highest Tobin’s Q firms, the commonly used 
proxy for growth/investment opportunities
10
. 
Despite the debate on ICF sensitivities as a measure, or not, of financing constraints, the 
investment intensity regressions can still be used while being agnostic on the financing 
constraints interpretation (Asker et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, regardless of our position in relation this question, it is of common 
knowledge that LBO structures face restrictions on investments, acquisitions, either 
                                                             
9 Weisbach (1988) defines entrenchment as “Managerial entrenchment occurs when managers gain so 
much power that they are able to use the firm to further their own interests rather than the interests of 
shareholders”. 




directly or through restrictive covenants
11
. Hence it is hardly debatable that they face 
some degree of constraints.  
2.3.2.3. Endogeneity  
Another important issue, which requires attention when addressing the CAPEX issue, is 
the endogeneity question. It is possible that PE could know beforehand those companies 
that require less CAPEX or have lower positive NPV investment opportunities and that 
fact determines by itself the posterior evolution. 
The lower CAPEX can be a symptom of less investment opportunities. In fact, as 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) conclude “high debt usage typically found in LBOs 
may not be an appropriate financing structure for companies with large capital 
expenditures needs.”.  
Indeed, Bharath and Dittmar (2010) built 2 models, Cox hazard and a logit, to predict if 
a firm will go private
12
 and the coefficient for the variable CAPEX / Sales is negative 
both for MBOs and PE buyouts, albeit only statistically significant in MBOs.    
The use of matched samples and firm fixed effects, which absorb all not visible 
differences, mitigate this issue. 
Some authors enhance the approach to endogeneity with an Instrumental Variable 
approach (Asker et al., 2015) or a Treatment-Effect model (Sousa and Jenkinson, 2013), 
either as a complement or robustness verification for the matching procedure, using an 
exogenous control for a variable that affects the company status, without directly 
affecting investment.  
Others use a propensity score, as in Bharath et al. (2014), where following previous 
work from two of the authors (Bharath and Dittmar, 2010) they include an additional 
match criteria based on the probability (in the case) of going private. By matching on 
the propensity score, they compare the results for the establishments that went private 
with the ones exhibited by firms that had a similar probability of being selected into 
going-private event.  
                                                             
11 Common examples are Debt/EBITDA or even Debt/(EBITDA-CAPEX) and EBIT/Interest.    
12 They attain accuracy rates higher than 80%.  
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2.4. Discussion and Opened Questions 
Despite the fact that in the last two years the theme started to receive some attention, we 
can still consider there is a limited the scope of literature regarding to the impact of PE 
in investments. This seems to contrast with the importance of the topic.  
A report produced by Frontier Economics (2013) for the European Private Equity & 
Venture Capital Association (EVCA) stated “We do not yet know enough about the 
incremental impact of private equity on fixed capital formation (...)” 
There are two main reasons for the importance of the subject. First, if it was verified 
that PE backed firms cut necessary, positive NPV investments, this could, to some 
extent, undermine the previous operating performance gains conclusions. In the words 
of Smith (1990) “(...) cutbacks in capital expenditures, are alleged to compromise the 
long-run competitive position of the firm in order to increase short-run cash flows.”13.  
To illustrate this point, imagine a company engaged in manufacturing one good, by 
using just one machine, with very expensive parts and components. If the firm cuts the 
maintenance CAPEX it could be able to attain a significant cash flow for some time, 
higher than its peers, who keep replacing defective or worn out parts, or upgrading 
some of its components with more technologically advanced solution. At some point, 
the temporary gain on cash flow will start to dent the firm’s profitability and 
productivity, as stoppage times and expensive repairs start to happen.  
Given the length of years usually covered by empirical studies (up to 3 years post-
buyout), this seems, at least theoretically, an admissible scenario.   
This argument could be the explanation for Holthausen and Larcker (1996) lagged 
performance reversal after the IPO/RLBO. Bruton et al. (2002), who confirm these 
results
14
, refer they would expect a firm to converge to a typical industry firm after the 
IPO, suffering again from the agency issue. However, they expected it to happen more 
quickly and not to be such a lagged effect. They conclude that “efficacy of agency 
                                                             
13 Albeit he concludes that the cuts in CAPEX are not responsible for the short-term increase in operating 
cash flows, as CAPEX is a non-operating use of cash, the point still remains open for the long run.  
14 On the operating side; they don’t address the CAPEX issue.  
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theory for explaining a complex topic such as firm performance during the buyout cycle 
may be limited”.  
Second, this is, in fact, one of the most common anecdotal criticisms made to PE 
activity: “The most common criticism of private equity activities claims that such funds 
apply a short-term calculus (...) which in turn strongly implies that capital spending 
should decline or at a minimum underperform other peer companies” (Shapiro and 
Pham, 2009) .  
To some extent one can interpret the, until recently, apparent lack of interest in the 
literature for the theme as an implicit acceptance of the evidence that the PE firms cut 
CAPEX after the buyout as a confirmation of the correction of the agency problem 
(Jensen, 1986).  
However, this tacit acceptance seems somehow disconnected from the broader debate 
on whether public firms really overinvest on the back of agency /free cash flow 
problems.  
Stein (1988) presented a complete opposite view, by describing what he called as a 
“managerial myopia” that lead managers in public corporations, to sacrifice long term 
goals and investments, to be able to present steadily growing quarter earnings and thus 
prevent takeovers. Hence, under this view, public firms should underinvest.  
Given the fact that research is prone to be US centric and the absence of private firms’ 
data in the US
15
, the question remained mostly as a theoretical debate. Nevertheless, 
some surveys seemed to back Stein (1988) assertion, by pointing to the fact that public 
firm managers prefer short term horizon investments, believing that investors fail to 
properly value long term investments (Poterba and Summers, 1995) and that managers 
would avoid engaging positive NPV projects if that implied an impact in current 
quarter’s earnings (Graham et al., 2005).  
Recently, building on a exclusive and new private firm database, Asker et al. (2015) 
show that, in US, public firms invest less and are less sensitive to changes in investment 
                                                             




opportunities than private firms, even during the recent financial crisis, when private 
firms most probably became more financially constrained than their public counterparts. 
On a different approach, Kerstein and Kim (1995) had already shown that, after 
controlling for parallel earnings information and size-related pre disclosure information 




These findings support Stein (1988) idea of underinvestment in public firms due to 
“myopia” rather than Jensen (1986) notion that public firm are prone to overinvestment 
as a result of free cash flow / agency related problems.     
This can bring some additional light to the investment impact debate on PE backed 
firms. If in fact, the majority of studies show that PE impact negatively investment, and 
if public firms tend to invest less than private counterparts, it seems reasonable to, at 
least, suspect that this reduction in investment is not related to a agency problem 
correction but to a strategic approach from the financial sponsor to release as much cash 
as possible to meet debt repayments and de-lever
17
.      
Albeit some studies have recently debated the investment issue directly, there seems to 
be still significant space to research. Engel and Stiebale (2014), for example, focus on 
SME’s, hardly were the main discussion is centred. Bharath et al. (2014) use plant level 
data (US only), which can be at the same time information rich but also somehow lead 
to the firm broader picture loss and its hardly replicated and comparable to previous 
studies.  
Finally, Ughetto (2014) narrows the analysis in private to private transactions, low and 
medium tech firms and in 4 countries. Furthermore, this author uses an Euler equation 
to deal with the investment opportunities issue (Q theory), instead of the more widely 
used proxies such as sales growth or industry Q (Asker et al., 2015). 
                                                             
16 These results are in line with previous works such as McConnell and Muscarella (1985) who found 
empirical evidence, from market reaction to unexpected decreases and increases in CAPEX, more 
consistent with market value maximization rather than size maximization.   
17 Please bear in mind that we are referring only to CAPEX and are not questioning the managerial 
incentives and ownership control impacts on performance, which are a separate discussion to which we 
are agnostic as far as this study goes.   
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3. Sample and Methodology  
3.1 Sample 
3.1.1 Retrieving process and source 
Bearing in mind that our goal is to analyse the PE first time entry impact
1
, our sample, 
retrieved from Zephyr database, encompasses all PE entry deals (“Take Private” and 
“Vendor Sale”), majority stakes, that were not secondary but-outs, in all sector with 
exception of banking and insurance or holding companies/head offices, in the 2006 to 
2010 period, with a minimum €50m (50 million Euros) deal value and in European 
Union (“Euro-28”).  
The end date is justified by the fact that we need 3 years of post deal financials for our 
analysis and, at the time of retrieval, the last year with financials was 2013. The start 
date is conditioned by the fact that Amadeus only provides 10 years of financials and we 
need 2 years of pre-del data, in order to have beginning of year values for the lagged 
variables in the pre-deal year.  
 As for the deals size, the choice is justified, as usual, in order to exclude smaller 
companies and deals harder to analyse, or at least be less comparable with larger ones.  
Bank and insurance are not comparable to other non-financial firms, and fall out of this 
study scope, and regarding “Head Offices” or “Holding” activities it is commonly 
accepted that these companies are difficult to analyse on a non case study basis.  
Our query resulted in 585 deals, which we reduced to 443, mainly due to the lack of a 
BvD ID number which precludes us from retrieving financials in Amadeus. 
As shown in Table 1, for 164 companies there was no data (no retrieval or retrieved 
fields with “n.a.”.  
Finally, for the 279 companies for which we had data, we eliminated all the companies 
(187) were we didn’t have all our key metrics, for all the years. This envisaged having a 
                                                             
1 Secondary or posterior Buy-Outs impact and motives can be very different from the first entry and 
should be analysed separately. See, for example, Sousa and Jenkinson (2013) or Achleitner and Figge 
(2014) for this topic. 
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sample highly comparable through the years (balanced panel). We ended up accepting 
some lacunae in data for secondary metrics, namely debt, EBIT and interests.  
 
Table 1 - PE Entries sample “cleaning” 
Zephir Sample 585 
Take out 
 Insolvency 1 
Administration 2 
Public takeover - Unsuccessful 18 
Acquisition Increase 10 
Unknown BvD ID 111 
Sample for financials retrieving 443 
No Data 164 
Incomplete Financials 187 
Final Sample 92 
 
The size of our sample is far from being uncommon, as it can be seen in Appendix I. 
Studies with large samples usually relax the deal size threshold or are specifically 
targeting to analyse SME’s, which as we already addressed, can vary from larger 
corporates both in the deal drivers as well as in posterior impact.  
Furthermore, as we show further below, the elimination of incomplete financial firms 
does not seem to have any statistically significant impact in our pre-deal year metrics.  
3.1.2 Sample Description  
Our 92 target companies are from 11 of Euro-28 countries, notwithstanding the fact 
that, as one would expect, the majority (50%) is from the UK. 
In terms of sectors, our sample encompasses 76 different 4-digit Nace codes, but to give 
a broader view of the different activities we grouped them in EVCA’s sector clusters2, 
which show that 63% of our sample comes from the Business and Industrial Products 
and Services (“BIPS”) and Consumer Products, Services and Retail (“CPSR”), leaving a 
residual importance for tech related companies, utilities and other sectors. Our sample 
seems to be dominated by “old economy” or traditional sectors. 
                                                             
2 Please refer to EVCA website for details of correspondence between clusters and Nace codes: 
http://www.evca.eu/media/12926/sectoral_classification.pdf.   
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 Figure 1 depicts countries and sectors breakdown in detail. 
 
Figure 1 - Target's Country
3




Concerning deal years, as depicted in Figure 2, our sample is dominated by pre and 
early start of the crisis deals as 64% of the transactions occurred in 2006/7. 
Figure 2 - Deals per year 
 
 
Finally, Table 2 shows that the majority of the deals in our sample were institutional 
buy-outs, and our sample includes both private to private and public to private deals. 
                                                             
3 Countries ISO Codes: Belgium (BE), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), 
France (FR), United Kingdom (GB), Hungary (HU), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Sweden (SE). 
4 EVCA Clusters: Agriculture, Chemicals and Materials (ACM), Business and Industrial Products and 
Services (BIPS), Consumer Products Services and Retail (CPSR), Energy and Environment (EE), 
Financial Services (FS), Communications Computer and Consumer Electronics (ICT) and Life Sciences 
(LS). 
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Table 2 - Deal type breakdown 
Institutional buy-out 100% 57 
Institutional buy-out 50%-99.9% 20 
Acquisition 100% 5 
Acquisition 75% minus one vote 1 
Management buy-out 100% 9 
 
As shown in Table 3 our final sample had an average (median) total assets of €319m 
(€94m), sales of €196m (€95m) and an EBITDA of €23m (€8m).  
Despite the fact that we do lack several companies’ financials, for the ones we have 
data, the final sample is not statistically different than the initial sample, in any of the 
shown metrics, which seems to indicate that we do have a representative sample.   
 
 Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics  
This table reports some key financials for the pre transaction year (n-1) for the initial sample and the 
final sample. Panel A has the EBITDA, total assets and sales in €m. Panel B shows three key     
ratios for our research, investment and EBITDA deflated by beginning of year total assets, and sales 
growth. Panel C has some additional characterization ratios. Significance tests for the difference 
between samples given by two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Values are winsorised between 
0.05 and 0.95 percentiles for Panels B and C. 
PANEL A  
      
 
EBITDA Total Assets Sales 
 
Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final 
 Mean 30.0 22.5 366.7 318.8 267.0 196.4 
 Median 6.9 8.2 91.8 94.0 76.8 94.8 
 Std. Dev. 87.9 51.2 858.3 805.1 946.9 388.9 
 N 132 92 167 92 150 92 
 Dif Initial vs Final (signif.): 
   PANEL B 
      
 
CAPEX / Total Assets  EBITDA / Total Assets Sales Growth 
 
Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final 
 Mean 0.1027 0.0956 0.1167 0.1199 0.1297 0.1314 
 Median 0.0455 0.0469 0.1013 0.1087 0.0909 0.0987 
 Std. Dev. 0.1689 0.1449 0.1281 0.1138 0.3275 0.2191 
 N 123 92 132 92 129 92 
 Dif Initial vs Final (signif.): 
   PANEL C 
      
 
Fixed Assets / Total Assets D/(D+E) Cash / Total Assets 
 
Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final 
 Mean 0.4751 0.4504 0.6227 0.5883 0.1071 0.1232 
 Median 0.4362 0.4027 0.8419 0.7709 0.0380 0.0545 
 Std. Dev. 0.3195 0.2862 0.3947 0.3974 0.1469 0.1549 
 N 166 92 134 81 151 90 
 Dif Initial vs Final (signif.): 
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3.2 Methodological Considerations 
3.2.1 Descriptive evolution  
As usual, we compare the evolution of several key metrics from the year before the 
transaction (n-1) to the year 1 (n+1), 2 (n+2) and 3 (n+3) after the transaction. The 
transaction year is left out as it is difficult to separate what is PE influence.  
We analysed 5 different investment or CAPEX intensity measures.  
The first two are the year’s CAPEX deflated by the year-end as well as by the year-start 
total assets (“Lag total assets” or “Lag TA”).   
Some studies do not make a distinction, while others categorically deflate either by 
year-start or by year-end total assets. We agree with the view that it makes more sense 
to deflate by the year-beginning quantum, as it reflects better the investment decisions 
within the year, as the year-end measure is already influenced by the year’s investment 
policy. Nevertheless for consistency check purposes we decided to present both.  
We also present the CAPEX deflated by the year’s sales as it is customary. By sales we 
are actually referring to turnover or operating revenues. Comparability across sector is 
enhanced by the use of the latter, as it includes services rendered, which, in some 
sectors, can be the only source of income (no actual sales are recorded as per accounting 
definitions).  
Furthermore, we present 2 additional measures. The measure of “expansionary 
CAPEX” deflated also by year-start and year-end total assets.  
“Expansionary CAPEX” (sometimes referred to as “growth CAPEX”) envisages being 
a measure of how much the company is investing beyond the simple maintenance of its 
current production capacity, i.e, in expanding its potential growth. Whilst it is hard to 
categorize in each company what is exactly “expansionary” and what is “maintenance” 
CAPEX, at least from an outside observer’s perspective, typically one expects the 
annual depreciations to be a measure, or at least a proxy, of what a company needs to 
invest order to keep its production capacity, as the depreciation itself is calculated, at 
least in principle, on the basis of the expected useful life of the equipment. 
24 
 
This metric sometimes is just called Net CAPEX and is used as the key metric, but we 
believe that it could be useful as support but not as a core measure. The difference 
between gross and net CAPEX is D&A, and, as such, can be somehow arbitrary, 
impacted by the countries’ fiscal policies, and to some extent manipulated by the 
company. Hence, whilst the potential distortions can be acceptable in our expansionary 
proxy, a secondary measure, it is our understanding that gross CAPEX captures better 
the company’s investment policy.     
We define then expansionary CAPEX (“g CAPEX”) as the year’s CAPEX – D&A. One 
alternative measure of the expansionary CAPEX is to present CAPEX/D&A. However 
this measure is not very stable in companies in early stages as the D&A is still low (e.g. 
if the equipments are still in assembly or construction phase are not depreciated) and 
inflates the measure when compared to the chosen.  
Our definition of CAPEX is then year-end fixed assets minus year-start fixed assets plus 
D&A. Three methodological choices arise from this definition.  
First, we include the acquisitions effect, following Sousa and Jenkinson (2013) or  
Asker et al. (2015) and by opposition of others as Kaplan (1989). While the former 
consider acquisitions the latter does not.  
The distinction between CAPEX and acquisitions can be important when comparing 
public with private firms (hence, in pre-post analysis in public to private transactions) 
due to the fact both are alternatives to acquire physical assets (instead of acquiring a 
new equipment, the company can acquire another company that has that same 
equipment). Nevertheless, private firms are less likely to engage in acquisitions as they 
are unable to pay them with stock and, as such, their overall investment is likely to 
involve relatively more CAPEX (without acquisitions) than public firms (Asker et al., 
2015). 
Second, as it is implicit we also consider investment in intangible assets as CAPEX. 
The same basic reasoning as before applies to this choice: the relative importance of 
tangible versus intangible assets and CAPEX can be quite different across sectors. 
Hence, if we only consider tangible CAPEX, we may fail to acknowledge those 
differences.   
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We also analyse the evolution of 5 profitability/cash flow metrics. Earning before 
interests depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA”) deflated by year-start and year-end 
total assets (commonly referred to as ROA) and by the year’s sales.  It is also presented 
2 measures of cash flow, defined as EBITDA less CAPEX, deflated both by year-end 
and year-start total assets. 
We also aimed to analyse the evolution of leverage. For this, instead of using debt to 
assets, we opted to use the measures more commonly used on the PE deals financing 
structures as covenants, Debt/EBITDA and EBIT/Interest, the latter more accurately a 
serviceability measure.  
However, when comparing Debt/EBITDA in big samples, where negative values can 
occur (and, in fact, we have several), a contradiction arises: a negative value is bad, as it 
indicates negative cash flow (proxy) and, hence, no repayment capacity, but the 
negative values reduce the overall measure, either mean or median, thus 
underestimating it.  
A solution could be to consider only positive values, which would, however, still 
somehow underestimate the measure of the group’s leverage.  
Hence, we decide to present these measures as the difference to the sector median: when 
the value is negative it is added (positive sign) to the sector median, when positive is 
subtracted to it. Thus, a negative value means a value lower than the sector median and, 
albeit somehow still underestimating it, the negative individual values contribute to 
increase the group’s overall measure.        
3.2.2 Sector Medians  
For the 76 4-digit Nace codes in our sample, we extracted all the private companies in 
Amadeus database (for the Euro-28 area), which encompassed more than 150 thousand 
companies, which, after cleaned of all the missing incomplete data for the whole period, 
came down to 17,804 companies. We only kept companies with values for all of our 
metrics, during the entire 10 year period, in order to have a fully comparable set of 
companies during the decade.  
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3.2.3 Investment Opportunities 
A company investment decisions should be influenced by its investment opportunities. 
It is not expectable that two similar companies, with different investment opportunities, 
have the same investment policy.  
Hence, in order to be fully comparable, the investment decisions need to account for the 
different investment opportunities. In the empirical investment literature, investment 
opportunities are usually represented by Tobin’s Q, which is typically defined as the 
firm’s market value to the book value of its assets (as a proxy to its replacement cost).  
The problem with this ratio is that is not available for private firms.  Asker et al. (2015) 
suggests the alternative usage of Sales growth
5
, referred to as widely used in the 
literature, and an “Industry Q”, constructed as a size-weighted average Q of all public 
firms in that industry.  
A third alternative comes from Campello and Graham (2013) who suggest regressing 
public firms’ Q against variables that theoretically explain it6, and then use the 




We used 4 alternative measures of investment opportunities: industry average Q
8
, the 
industry median Q, the theoretical estimated Q and sales growth.  
For industry Q means and medians, we extracted all the public firms for our 76 4-digit 
Nace codes in Amadeus, for which we were able to have a balanced panel with market 
capitalization, net debt and total assets for the entire period, of 1,836 companies. A 
considerable number of public companies missed market capitalization data.  
We then calculated sector mean and median Q’s. As we missed or otherwise had a small 
sample for some sectors, we considered the values for the 2-digit Nace code, 
encompassing 35 sectors.  
                                                             
5 Henceforward, sales growth means sales n / sales n-1, where n is the year where we are estimating 
CAPEX or investment intensity (e.g., CAPEX/Total assets).  
6 The authors use sales growth, return on assets (EBITDA divided by beginning-of-year total assets), net 
income before extraordinary items, book leverage, and year and industry fixed effects. 
7 Interestingly, according to the authors, when used in the regression to explain investment, this 
Fundamental Q has higher explanatory power than the “real” market Q.  
8 We used simple average instead of size weighted average. 
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As detailed in Table 4, for the calculation of predicted Q’s we estimated 5 equations, by 
making a regression of the listed companies’ Q with combinations of variables that 
theoretically can explain it, as mentioned.  
 
Table 4 - Predicting Tobin's Q 
This table reports 5 potentially explaining regressions for Tobin’s Q. Data in Panel with unbalance 
data (some missing values mainly leverage).  We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Year and industry (EVCA clusters) fixed effects 
(manual dummies, ACM omitted, as automatic cross-section fixed effects would be firm fixed 
effects). Year fixed effects test given by redundant fixed effects – Likelihood Ratio. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White diagonal) are shown in italics under the 
coefficient estimates. Median sector Q is at the 35 2-digit Nace code level (value per year). Values 
were not winsorised.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ROA 0.2611 *   0.2624 * 0.3094 *** 0.2670 * 
 
0.1434    0.1445  0.0481  0.1446  
Lag ROA   0.0074        
 
  0.0147        
Sales g       0.0000    
 
      0.0000    
Leverage (D/TA)     0.0289  0.0589    
 
    0.0569  0.0447    
Median Sector Q 
 
        1.2191 *** 
 
        0.063  
 
          
Constant 0.7061 *** 0.7380 *** 0.7000 *** 0.6930 *** 0.01774  
 
0.0485  0.0471  0.0503  0.0942  0.0476  
 
          
Obs. 8960  8632  8960  8506  8959  
Adjusted R-squared 6.4%  6.1%  6.4%  6.5%  10.2%  
F-statistic 41.5 *** 38.2 *** 39.0 *** 36.0 *** 511.7 *** 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** No  
Period Fixed Effects  Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** No  
 
Model (5) seems to fit better data and it’s built under the premise that individual Q’s 
converge to sector norm and that differences are explained by ROA. Hence, we chose 
model (5) to apply to our PE backed companies to estimate a predicted Q for each year.  
3.2.4 Investment Regressions 
Following the traditional investment literature
9
 and Asker et al. (2015), we used two 
base equations (3.1) which envisages analysing the private equity firms and the peers 
                                                             
9 In the traditional investment literature, or “Q-theory”, investment intensity is usually regressed against 
Tobin’s Q or proxy, and other investment determinants, such as ROA. Asker et al. (2015) explains that 
that empirical work shows that standard proxies for investment opportunities are not, as neoclassical 
theory predicts, a sufficient statistic for investment and that ROA correlates positively with investment. 
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(see below) separately, or together, by adding a PE dummy variable, isolating its effect; 
and (3.2) which aims to interact and compare directly the PE firms with its peers, 
isolating its impact in each of the explainable variables.  
   
     
                                (3.1) 
   
     
                                                           (3.2) 
Where I is the investment, or CAPEX, A the beginning of year (or end of year) total 
assets, Q the proxy for Tobin’s Q, as discussed above, PE the dummy for private equity 
status
10
 and ROA, meaning the EBITDA divided by total assets (again either beginning 
or end of year). The equations include firm (   and  ) and year (   and     fixed effects 
and allow estimating within-firm variation in investment in response to within-firm 
variation in investment opportunities. The PE interaction allows comparing the 
investment sensitivities of PE firms with its peers (or public and private firms in the 
posterior analysis).  
3.2.5 Matching  
Not visible, or not controlled, characteristics can determine variations in firms’ 
investment levels. In order to control or, at least, minimize the effects of any potential 
bias, a matching procedure should be implemented. The goal is to compare firms that 
are, in fact, similar.    
We followed Asker et al. (2015) approach, a calliper-based nearest-neighbour match 
adapted to a panel setting, which consists in finding for each public firm, the private 
firm, or for each PE backed firm the private non PE backed firm, closest in size in the 
same industry code, by requiring the ratio of total assets between the two firms to be 
less than 2. In the case there is no match, the observation is discarded. The matches are 
held constant in subsequent years to ensure the panel structure remains intact.    
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Hence, one can include it in the regression, conditioning investment with ROA, a measure of Cash Flow 
(as ROA is defined as EBITDA/beginning of year Assets), regardless of its interpretation discussion (as 
mentioned in 2.3.2.2. regarding the ICF sensitivity debate).  
10 Asker et al. (2015) use a public/private firm dummy.  
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Asker et al. (2015) unlike Bharath et al. (2014) do not match firms based on age and 
present an interesting argument against “overmatching”11. Furthermore, they show that 
matched samples result, as one would expect from previous research, in younger, higher 
ROA, less cash and more indebted private firms, which nonetheless does not impact the 
overall conclusions.    
In our matching procedure for the public-private pairs we followed closely Asker et al. 
(2015), using 4-digit NACE code instead of 4-digit NAICS. We used VBA coding in 
Excel to make the matching computations (please see Appendix II).  
As for the PE firms and peer private firms matching we adopted the same methodology, 
matching firms on n-1 and keeping them as peers afterwards, relaxing however the <2x 
relationship between the firms TA
12
, as in some industries we ended up with few 
companies.  
Furthermore, in order to minimize the impact of outliers (as our PE firm sample is 
relatively small) we selected not one but two peers (the two closest) and compare to the 
mean of the pair.  
The percentage of times the ratio between the two firms was >2x was 20% (please bear 
in mind that we have 2 sets of pairs which is likely to increase the incidence of 
threshold breaches). The median ratio was 1.15, which seems to indicate we have close 
peers in size.  




                                                             
11 “The purpose of matching is not to eliminate all observable differences between public and private 
firms but to make firms comparable along the dimensions thought to affect the outcome variable of 
interest (here: investment). Overmatching on dimensions unrelated to the outcome variable of interest 
results in samples that are unrepresentative of their respective populations. In other words, we can make 
matched firms arbitrarily similar to each other on arbitrarily many dimensions, but as we do so, the firms 
that end up in the matched sample become ever less representative of their respective groups. See 
Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) for an exhaustive discussion of this point.” 
12 The relationship is between the max(company A; company B)/min(company A; company B) to force 
the results to be always >1; otherwise we would have to work with 0.5 < company A/ company B <2, 
which would introduce unnecessary complexity.  
13 It seems arguable that it is the dimension, at least isolated, that determines the investment behaviour. 
Regardless of the overmatching discussion, we envisaged introducing the profitability (ROA) dimension, 
statistically highly correlated with investment intensity. However, in some sectors the 2 dimensions 
together determined that we would end up with very different companies in one of the sides or, if we 
imposed a maximum relationship (e.g. the two times cap), we would end up without peers. One solution 
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In this case, the incidence of cases where the 2x cap was breached was just 3% (1.01x 
median), which seems to indicate that we have closer peers under this criteria. The 
mean absolute difference between ROA is 0.23 percentage points, which confirms that 
we get really close peers in ROA terms
14
.       
As depicted in Figure 3, we seem to capture relatively similar companies, in terms of 
investment policy, by both matching methods, albeit peers matched on ROA seem to be 
much more centred and with less outliers/fat tails.   






































CAPEX/ Lagged TA     
 
3.2.6 Endogeneity 
One common method to deal with endogeneity is to control for effects that originate the 
predisposition. The matched sample procedure tends to minimize this bias. Also the 
firm level fixed effects absorbs other non visible within firm differences.  
We use both a matching as well as firm fixed effects. As our sample encompasses both 
public and private firms pre-deal, we believe this procedure suffices.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
could be to relax the sector matching from the 4 digit code to a 1 digit code or to EVCA clusters. 
However, we consider that the sector has a considerable influence in investment intensities, playing a 
more incisive role than introducing a third, dimension. To illustrate this point, consider glass packaging 
companies, a highly CAPEX intensive industry, in which the major investment relates to furnaces 
overhauls and that somehow behaves in “waves”, meaning one or two years of sizeable CAPEX followed 
by several years of reduced CAPEX, even below what one could consider maintenance CAPEX. Both the 
intensity and investment pattern have nothing to do with paper packaging which, under a less 
demanding/precise industry classification, would end up both being classified as just “packaging” or even 
worse. 
14 To be precise as explained in Appendix II, in ROA matching algorithm we did not use a 2x ratio but a 
2x the difference between ROAs in order to better deal with negative values.  
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4. PE impact on Investments on Entry – Empirical findings 
 4.1 Descriptive Evolution 
Three years after entry, the median PE backed firm in our sample grew less its sales 
than both its sector median (“SM”) and its matched peers in ROA (“PROA”) and in 
total assets (“PTA”). As depicted in Figure 4, in sales terms, our PE sample behaved 
closely to its PTA and the PROA group was aligned with sector median.  
 
Figure 4 – Median Cumulative Sales (left) and Total Assets (right) Growth 
This Figure depicts the sales and total assets median cumulative evolution for the 3 years after the 
buyout when compared to the year before the buyout. Below the charts we show the numbers. 
Significance tests given by the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test for the cumulative change from 
year n-1 to n+i and the two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum for the difference between group. We use ***, 
**, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Values are 
winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles. 
  
 n+1 n+2 n+3  n+1 n+2 n+3 
PE 0.1030** 0.0213* 0.0389  0.0769** 0.1089*** 0.1903*** 
Peer ROA 0.1125*** 0.1481*** 0.1983***  0.0535*** 0.1480*** 0.1546*** 
Peer TA 0.0803*** 0.0446*** 0.0554***  0.0603*** 0.0866*** 0.1058*** 
SM 0.1131*** 0.1131*** 0.1528***  0.1467*** 0.2171*** 0.2657*** 
Differences:         
PE – Peer ROA   *** 
 
    
PE – Peer TA         
PE – Sector Med  * **  ** **  
Peer TA – Sector Med  ** **  *** *** *** 
Peer ROA – Sector Med     *** ** ** 
 
At year 3, the difference was statistically significant (two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum - 
Mann-Whitney – test) at 5% and 1% for the sector median and PROA. Furthermore, 
PTA’s cumulative sales growth at year 3 was also statistically different (5%) from 








1 2 3 years 















1 2 3 Years 
Cumulative Total Assets growth 
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However, in terms of total assets the evolution was quite different, with our PE firms 
differing from sector median during the first 2 years, but not in the third, and never 
differing statistically from its matched peers. 
The peers, however, had a statistically different evolution from the SM (1% significance 
for PTA and 5% for PROA).       
Regarding investment intensity, Table 5 shows in Panel A the mean and median 
percentage points change in the 5 alternative metrics, from year n-1 to the first three 
years after the entry, and for the 4 groups (PE, SM, PTA and PROA). The value of 
change is given by (Metricn+i – Metricn-1) x 100, where Metric is one of the 5 alternative 
investment intensity ratios, for each group, i is the year after entry, from 1 to 3.   
Data shows that by year 3 there is a statistically significant reduction, under all of our 
selected metrics. Despite the fact that the averages are considerably higher than 
medians, as a result of considerable amount of extreme higher values, the same 
conclusion is derived from both statistics. 
For example, the average (median) PE backed firm by n+3 had reduced by 4.048 
(1.020) percentage points (“pp”) its CAPEX deflated by its beginning of year total 
assets (Lag TA). This implies that the mean in year 3 (not shown) is shy from half of the 
one in n-1.  
Furthermore, the expansionary CAPEX intensity proxy (g CAPEX / Lag TA) reduction 
implies that the median PE backed firm cut its expansionary CAPEX to virtually 0 in 
n+3.  
Also worth highlighting that some statistically significant evolutions by n+1 stop being 
so by year n+2, which seems to be a year a major volatility and where apparently some 
companies partially correct the CAPEX cuts performed during the previous year. 
Putting this evolution into context, the sector medians also present a clear reduction 
trend in investment intensity. By year n+3, only the median change in CAPEX / Sales is 




Table 5 - Investment Intensity change after entry 
This table reports in Panel A the mean and median percentage points change in 5 investment intensity metrics for the first 3 years after entry when compared to the pre-
deal year and in Panel B the difference between medians and medians for the groups. The values are presented for the PE firms, the sector median (of each PE firm) and 
the peers matched on total assets and on ROA. Significance tests given by the t-statistic for means and two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test for medians in Panel A and 
Anova F-Test and the two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum for means and medians, respectively, in Panel B. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level (two-sided), respectively. Values are winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles.  




Peers matched on TA 
 
Peers matched on ROA 
n-1 to n+1 n-1 to n+2 n-1 to n+3 
 
n-1 to n+1 n-1 to n+2 n-1 to n+3 
 
n-1 to n+1 n-1 to n+2 n-1 to n+3 
 
n-1 to n+1 n-1 to n+2 n-1 to n+3 
 CAPEX / TA   Mean -2.434 * -1.494  -2.588 **  -0.918 *** -0.718 *** -0.750 ***  -1.285  -1.114  -2.720 ***  -1.805 ** 0.253  -0.473  
 Median -1.203  -0.695  -1.482 **  -0.528 *** -0.598 *** -0.631 ***  -0.771  -1.132  -1.868 ***  -1.356 ** -0.552  -0.656  
 Std. Dev. 11.789  11.069  10.131   2.001  1.582  1.717   9.144  8.746  9.499   8.597  8.840  8.806  
CAPEX /Lag 
TA 
 Mean -3.428 ** -2.735 * -4.048 ***  -1.165 *** -0.969 *** -0.982 ***  -1.939 * -1.859 * -3.716 ***  -1.780  3.061  -0.662  
 Median -0.384 * -0.271  -1.020 **  -0.737 *** -0.821 *** -0.756 ***  -1.143  -1.932 * -1.907 ***  -1.651 *** -0.422  -1.274  
 Std. Dev. 14.761  15.037  14.180   2.209  1.910  2.008   10.946  10.356  11.358   11.599  18.340  12.513  
G CAPEX / TA  Mean -2.413 ** -1.665  -2.570 **  -0.576 *** -0.357 *** -0.365 ***  -1.129  -1.007  -2.388 **  -1.909 ** 0.787  -0.181  
 Median -1.084  -0.433  -0.873 **  -0.220 *** -0.119 ** -0.189 ***  -0.708  -0.346  -1.239 **  -0.844 * -0.319  -0.673  
 Std. Dev. 11.624  10.660  9.633   1.541  1.244  1.190   8.558  8.421  9.203   9.134  9.367  8.848  
G CAPEX / Lag 
TA 
 Mean -2.992 ** -2.343  -3.749 ***  -0.629 *** -0.432 *** -0.399 ***  -1.629  -1.568  -2.954 **  -1.855  3.412 * 0.003  
 Median -1.142 * -0.458  -1.019 **  -0.244 *** -0.137 *** -0.269 ***  -0.254  -0.843  -1.312 **  -0.966 * -0.076  -0.862  
 Std. Dev. 13.529  13.857  12.604   1.641  1.351  1.280   10.303  10.215  10.883   11.301  17.462  12.125  
CAPEX / Sales  Mean -2.434 * -1.494  -2.588 **  -0.665 *** -0.238  -0.036   -9.153 * -7.267  -12.892 **  -5.960  4.659  5.180  
 Median -1.203  -0.695  -1.482 **  -0.374 *** -0.305 *** -0.179 *  -0.981  -0.825  -1.664 **  -0.966  -0.225  -0.107  
 Std. Dev. 11.789  11.069  10.131   1.784  1.853  2.482   46.065  44.418  47.363   36.738  41.594  38.166  
Panel B PE Firms minus Sector Median 
 
PE Firms minus Peers on TA 
 
PE firms minus Peer on ROA 
n-1 n+1 n+2 n+3 
 
n-1 n+1 n+2 n+3 
 
n-1 n+1 n+2 n+3 
 CAPEX / TA  Mean 3.101 *** 1.584  2.325  1.262 **  0.454  -0.695  0.073  0.585   0.685  0.056  -1.062  -1.430  
 Median 0.920  0.362  0.742  0.581   -1.002  -0.595  -0.462  0.301   -1.003  0.199  -0.027  0.158  
CAPEX /Lag 
TA 
 Mean 4.753 *** 2.490 ** 2.987 ** 1.687 **  0.658  -0.832  -0.218  0.326   1.158  -0.490  -4.638 ** -2.227 ** 
 Median 0.476  0.190  0.439  0.702   -1.502  -0.782  -0.773  0.436   -2.024  -0.524  -0.704  -0.002  
G CAPEX / TA  Mean 2.881 *** 1.045  1.573 ** 0.676   0.899  -0.385  0.241  0.717   0.948  0.444  -1.504  -1.440 * 
 Median 1.132  0.239  0.377  0.162   -0.436  -0.173  0.514  -0.091   0.530  0.789  0.100  -0.653  
G CAPEX / Lag 
TA 
 Mean 4.314 *** 1.951 * 2.403 *** 0.964 *  0.885  -0.477  0.111  0.090   1.259  0.122  -4.496 ** -2.493 ** 
 Median 1.326  0.285  0.449  0.180   -0.295  -0.430  0.378  -0.146   0.667  0.813  -0.083  -0.537  
CAPEX / Sales  Mean 9.353 *** 8.678 *** 9.868 *** 5.738 ***  -10.066 * -2.254  -2.522  -0.824   -1.772  2.847  -6.155  -10.603 ** 
 Median 1.077  -0.192  1.681  1.056   -2.409  -2.616  -1.495  -0.384   -0.557  -0.389  -0.711  -0.229  
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A generalized reduction in investment is not surprising, as our sample is clearly 
concentrated in the financial crisis period.  
Table 5, Panel B shows, for each year, from pre-entry (n-1) to year 3 after buyout (n+3), 
the percentage points difference between the PE investment intensity metric, and each 
of the other peer groups, i.e., PE vs. SM, PE vs. PTA and PE vs. PROA.  The value is 
then (MetricPEi – MetricPGi) x100, where PEi and PGi are the value of the metric for the 
PE and for the peer group, respectively, in year i, the relative year from the deal, from -
1 to 3. 
When comparing the values between the groups, the conclusions seem different. In year 
n-1 PE firms invest statistically significant above the sector median, and, while this 
higher investment still holds in year n+3, it seems that PE firms somehow converged to 
sector norm, by reducing much more its investment levels.  
Comparison with PTA is not as clear cut, as differences are not consistent and not 
statistically different. Data does not support a difference in behaviour between PE and 
PTA firms.  
Peers matched on ROA, show a very dissimilar picture. Whilst no statistical significant 
difference is found in year n-1, by year n+3 all mean investment metrics, with exception 
of CAPEX/TA, show PE firms investing less than its peers (medians also show the 
same sign but the difference is not statistically significant). For example, mean CAPEX 
/Lag TA is 2.5 pp lower in PE than in PROA firms and mean CAPEX/Sales is 10.6 pp 
lower.  
The difference in behaviour is especially significant in our expansionary CAPEX 
measure. We do not show the absolute (metric/group/year) values, but for illustrative 
purposes, we can indicate that whilst a PE backed firm pre buyout invested on average 
(median) 4% (1.7%) of its beginning of year assets, the peers (on ROA) invested 3.6% 
(0.7%). By the end of the 3
rd
 year, while the behaviour remained virtually unchanged 
for the peer group, the PE backed firms had cut its expansionary CAPEX to 1.1% on 
average, and the median firm was only replacing assets (0% expansionary CAPEX).   
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Regarding profitability/cash-flow evolution, as show Table 6, Panel A, similar to what 
happened with CAPEX, data shows that sector medians statistically (mostly significant 
at 1%) reduce over the period, and that the decline is progressive. The exception is 
EBITDA / Sales, which peak reduction occurs in year n+2 and then recovers, to the 
point that in n+3 the reduction is not statistically significant. 
Contrasting with this trend, PE backed firms improve, as found in most of the literature, 
their profitability levels by year n+1 the improvements are statistically significant (at 
5% and 1%) with exception of ROA calculated on beginning of year TA (ROA Lag). 
However, unlike the literature, we somehow witness a reversal, to the point that by year 
n+2 and n+3 the improvements disappear and even represent a reduction, albeit not 
statistically significant. The exception is cash flow to lagged TA, that in n+3 still 
represents a significant (at 10%) 3.2 pp improvement, no doubt due to the reduction in 
CAPEX.  
In relation to our control groups, PTA also shows reductions in profitability levels, 
some of which statistically significant. For example, in year n+3, ROA calculated on 
lagged TA evidences a reduction of -1.5 and -0.7 pp in mean and median, respectively 
(5% and 10% significance).  
As PE firms, PTA firm’s cash-flow also increases, although with significance only in 
mean terms and when deflated by lagged TA.   
As for PROA firms, both ROA and ROA Lag show significant reductions of c. -2.5 and 
-1.8 pp in mean/median terms. Unlike the peer group matched on TA and PE firms, 
PROA group also reduces its cash-flows, significant against lagged TA. 
Comparing the groups, as shown in Table 6, Panel B, for each year, we can see that PE 
firms increase the distance for sector medians in profitability. Cash flow measures were 
lower than sector norm in n-1, albeit not significant, and become higher and statistically 




Table 6 - Profitability and Cash-Flow change after entry 
This table reports in Panel A the mean and median percentage points change in 5 profitability / cash flow metrics for the first 3 years after entry when compared to the pre-
deal year and in Panel B the difference between medians and medians for the groups. The values are presented for the PE firms, the sector median (of each PE firm) and 
the peers matched on total assets and on ROA. Significance tests given by the t-statistic for means and two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test for medians in Panel A and 
Anova F-Test and the two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum for means and medians, respectively, in Panel B. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level (two-sided), respectively. Values are winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles.  




Peers matched on TA 
 
Peers matched on ROA 
n-1 to n+1 n-1 to n+2 n-1 to n+3 
 
n-1 to n+1 n-1 to n+2 n-1 to n+3 
 
n-1 to n+1 n-1 to n+2 n-1 to n+3 
 
n-1 to n+1 n-1 to n+2 n-1 to n+3 
 ROA 
 
 Mean 2.743 ** -0.937  -0.853   -0.599 *** -1.055 *** -1.331 ***  -0.163  -1.316 ** -0.792   -1.341  -2.132 ** -2.503 *** 
 Median 1.571 ** -0.729  -1.050   -0.320 *** -1.106 *** -1.335 ***  -0.129  -1.336 *** -0.929 *  -0.265  -1.290 ** -1.783 *** 
 Std. Dev. 10.507  11.207  10.587   1.904  1.935  1.763   5.162  5.704  6.381   8.393  9.291  8.365  
ROA Lag 
 
 Mean 1.512  -2.341  -1.880   -0.846 *** -1.503 *** -1.793 ***  -0.491  -1.712 ** -1.539 **  -1.286  -2.002 * -2.589 *** 
 Median 0.299  -0.716  -1.514   -0.804 *** -1.354 *** -1.872 ***  0.090  -1.400 *** -0.756 *  -1.267  -1.262 ** -1.850 *** 
 Std. Dev. 14.763  14.609  14.118   1.927  2.231  2.184   6.465  6.785  7.400   8.696  9.898  9.189  
EBITDA / Sales  Mean 2.770 ** -0.824  1.558   -0.189  -0.431 ** -0.187   -4.474  -8.437 *** -4.167   0.117  1.844  1.723  
 Median 0.900 ** -0.313  0.743   -0.083  -0.526 *** -0.564 **  -0.147  -2.234 ** -1.634 *  -0.270  0.028  -1.685  
 Std. Dev. 13.056  15.672  16.109   2.180  1.983  2.336   28.412  30.635  30.963   24.969  15.892  21.845  
Cash Flow / TA  Mean 5.745 *** 0.628  1.875   -0.182  -0.666 *** -1.007 ***  0.792  -0.627  1.281   1.588  -3.058 * -2.101  
 Median 3.507 *** 0.401  0.700   -0.034  -1.091 *** -1.230 ***  0.222  -0.647  0.803   0.846  -1.105  -0.724  
 Std. Dev. 16.135  14.858  14.037   2.453  2.223  2.005   10.084  10.163  10.849   14.483  15.361  12.407  
Cash Flow / Lag 
TA 
 Mean 6.269 *** 1.083  3.235 *  -0.317  -0.878 *** -1.214 ***  1.562  0.076  2.320 *  0.409  -5.584 ** -2.476 * 
 Median 3.940 *** -0.110  0.842   -0.187  -1.360 *** -1.330 ***  1.379  0.212  0.966   -1.068  -1.594 * -1.048  
 Std. Dev. 18.926  18.297  17.613   2.641  2.248  2.020   12.467  11.614  12.484   14.958  21.187  14.147  
Panel B PE Firms minus Sector Median 
 
PE Firms minus Peers on TA 
 
PE firms minus Peer on ROA 
n-1 n+1 n+2 n+3 
 
n-1 n+1 n+2 n+3 
 
n-1 n+1 n+2 n+3 
 ROA 
 
 Mean 2.073 * 5.415 *** 2.192  2.551 **  1.540  4.446 *** 1.920  1.479   -0.419  3.664 ** 0.776  1.230  
 Median 1.384  2.768 * 1.840  2.131   1.060  1.827  0.460  0.796   -0.135  1.075  1.001  1.029  
ROA Lag 
 
 Mean 3.829 ** 6.187 *** 2.991 ** 3.741 ***  3.187 * 5.190 *** 2.558  2.846 *  1.644  4.443 ** 1.304  2.353  
 Median 1.087  2.208  2.231  2.131   0.368  1.246  0.367  1.421   -0.679  0.562  1.495  0.162  
EBITDA / Sales  Mean 3.859 ** 6.818 *** 3.467 * 5.605 ***  -8.632 ** -1.389  -1.019  -2.907   -0.624  2.029  -3.292  -0.789  
 Median 2.799 * 5.139 *** 1.949  2.123   -0.549  2.997  -0.863  -0.009   0.872  3.593 * -0.817  1.098  
Cash Flow / TA  Mean -0.155  5.772 *** 1.139  2.727 **  1.218  6.171 *** 2.472  1.812   -1.015  3.142  2.671  2.962 * 
 Median -0.190  2.775 *** 0.443  0.892   0.410  3.375 *** 0.084  1.341   0.543  0.787  0.710  1.987  
Cash Flow / Lag 
TA 
 Mean -0.851  5.736 *** 1.110  3.598 ***  2.196  6.903 *** 3.203  3.110 *  -0.832  5.028 ** 5.836 ** 4.879 *** 
 Median -0.976  2.703 *** 1.184  1.314   1.297  3.853 *** 1.049  1.286   0.108  0.858  1.470  2.104  
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In relation to PTA group, PE firms considerably increase the difference in the first year 
(n+1), although only means are statistically different in ROA terms (e.g. 5.2 pp higher 
in PE than PTA in mean ROA Lag). In cash flows, both means and medians are 
statistically different. However, given the aforementioned reversal in PE firms’ 
performance, the differences are no longer significant by year n+3, with exception of 
mean ROA Lag and mean Cash-Flow/Lag TA.  
As it’s not surprising there are no statistical differences between means/medians, in n-1, 
in PE vs PROA, as the latter was matched exactly on ROA. By year n+3 however, cash-
flow measures are significantly higher in PE firms, due to the mentioned cutbacks in 
CAPEX, whilst PROA firms basically kept their investment levels.   
Finally, in relation to our leverage and serviceability metrics, the results, as shown in 
Table 7, Panel A, show some evidence of increased leverage in our PE firms, and 
reduced interest cover (IC) in our peer groups. 
 
Table 7 - Leverage and Interest Cover 
This table reports in Panel A the mean and median change in the difference of each group’s debt to 
EBITDA and EBIT to interest (IC) to the sector median for the first 3 years after entry when compared to 
the pre-deal year and in Panel B the difference between medians and medians for the groups. The values 
are presented for the PE firms and the peers matched on total assets and on ROA. Significance tests given 
by the t-statistic for means and two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test for medians in Panel A and Anova 
F-Test and the two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum for means and medians, respectively, in Panel B. We use 
***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Values are 
winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles. 
Panel A PE minus SM 
 
PTA minus SM 
 
PROA minus SM 
n-1 to n+1 n-1 to n+2 n-1 to n+3 
 
n-1 to n+1 n-1 to n+2 n-1 to n+3 
 
n-1 to n+1 n-1 to n+2 n-1 to n+3 
Debt/ 
EBITDA  















  Median -0.2 
 




































-53.3 * -82.1 ** -73.7 ** 
 
-86.1 ** -83.2 ** -98.6 *** 


































 Panel B PE minus SM vs. PTA minus SM 
  
PE minus SM vs. PROA minus SM 






n+1 n+2 n+3 
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EBITDA  






























































Comparing the groups (Table 7, Panel B), results show that leverage increases in 
relation to the PROA group and also to PTA, although the latter without statistical 
significance. For example, the mean difference in debt to EBITDA towards the sector 
median is 3.0 higher in n+3 in PE firms than in PROA group (5.8x vs. 2.8x – not shown 
in the tables, which only shows the difference of 3.0). Medians have contradictory 
signs, but are not statistically significant.  
Interestingly, interest cover is also higher in PE backed firms than in PROA peers, in 
year n+3, which could be explained by lower interests, on the back of PE higher 
negotiating power and broader access to financing sources.        
4.2 Measuring Investment Opportunities 
Although the empirical research shows that other factors explain differences in 
investment intensity, namely and remarkably ROA, the according to the neoclassical 
approach those differences should simply be a result of different investment 
opportunities (Asker et al., 2015).  
We arranged our data in panel
1
 and estimated for our PE firms sample the sensitivity of 
the investment intensity to investment opportunities proxies and profitability/cash flow 
measure, as specified in equation (3.1).  
In Table 8, we show in the columns under “Proxies to Investment Opportunities”, for 
our main investment intensity metric, CAPEX/Lag TA, the estimation of the equation 
with 4 alternative proxies to Tobin’s Q: (1) sales growth; (2) estimated or “theoretical 
Q”; (3) median sector Q and; (4) mean sector Q. For the other investment intensity 
metrics we show under “Alternative Investment Intensity Measures” (regressions 5 to 8) 
the estimation, using only the Sales growth proxy to Tobin’s Q.  
                                                             
1 We include the civil year as the year identifier, which results in an unbalanced panel, as our data is 
balanced relatively (to deal) year terms. We consider, nonetheless, the advantaged of fixing civil years 
effect, for example, to isolate crisis years. An alternative “crisis” dummy did not seem to be a good 
approach (we did estimate several alternative formulations), as our sample encompasses very different 
European countries, which as commonly known, were affected by the crisis in different years (the impact 
in Europe was not simultaneous), and thus, identifying the years which could fall under the “crisis” 
dummy could be tricky.   
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The results show that as reported in the literature, sales growth seems to hold as a good 
investment opportunities proxy, given its statistical significance across the several 
investment intensities measures we defined.  
 
Table 8 - PE firms sensitivity to Investment Opportunities 
This table reports the estimation of Equation (3.1) for PE firms, testing the different proxies to investment 
opportunities as discussed, sales growth (1), Estimated Q (2), median sector Q (3) and mean sector Q (4). 
Investment opportunities proxies are tested against CAPEX to lagged total assets. We also present 
alternative measures of investment Intensity, regressed against sales growth as investment opportunities 
proxy. All regressions include company and year fixed effects. Fixed effects test given by Redundant 
Fixed Effects – Likelihood Ratio. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White diagonal) are 
shown in italics under the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Values are winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles, 
with exception of estimated, median and mean Q’s. 
 
Proxies to Investment Opportunities 
 
Alternative Investment Intensity Measures 
 








G CAPEX / 
Lag TA 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
ROA 
         
0.0528 
   
0.0206 
   
          
0.0558 
   
0.0537 
   
ROA Lag  0.2163 *** 0.2662 *** 0.2704 *** 0.2720 *** 
   
0.2011 










    
0.147 
   
0.056 
 
Sales growth 0.0580 ***  
      
0.0657 *** 0.1030 * 0.0523 *** 0.0455 ** 
 
0.021 












              
   
0.018 
              
Median Sector Q 
    
0.0199 
            
     
0.021 
            
Mean Sector Q 
      
0.0154 
          
       
0.011 
          



























                  Company /Year  
Fixed Effects: 
Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** 
 
Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** 
































F-statistic 3.09 *** 2.89 *** 2.90 *** 2.92 *** 
 
2.74 *** 3.89 *** 1.83 *** 2.00 *** 
 
Our alternative measures, such as sector’s median or mean Q or even our estimate of the 
“theoretical” Q don’t seem to hold. We recall that our Estimated Q was calculated with 
model (5) in Table 4.  
As reported in the investment literature, our sample of PE firms CAPEX intensity seems 
to be explained by variations in profitability/cash flow and investment opportunities, 
given by the Tobin’s Q proxy (sales growth in our case).  
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4.3 Conditional Investment Intensities – PE firms vs. Peers 
Our research question, however, is not determining the explainable variables for PE 
firms per se, but to determine how they compare with their peers, after controlling for 
those same explanatory variables. 
Equation (3.1) adapted with a PE dummy variable allows us to isolate the PE impact 
and equation (3.2) allows us to explore this through the interaction of the firm status 
(dummy variable) with the explainable variables and thus measure the impact of the 
specific nature of PE backed firms.  
We have estimated the equations for all the alternative investment intensity measures, 
we’ve considered previously, and for both set of peers at the same time as well as 
separately. 
We also separate the “pre PE” period (n-1 or n-1 and n if necessary) from the “post PE 
entry” period (n+1 to n+3) in order to assess the impact of the change in ownership.   
Several conclusions can be drawn from the results, which are shown in Table 9.  
First, Equation (3.1) as shown in Table 9  Panel A, seems to provide little evidence of 
any impact of the PE intervention in firms’ investment intensity, controlling for 
investment opportunities and cash-flow/profitability. In fact, only regression (4) in 
Table 9 Panel A, referring to the post PE entry and in a sample of PE and peers matched 
on ROA and regarding CAPEX / Lag TA, shows such an impact. In this model, the PE 
firm, everything else constant, has a CAPEX/Lag TA of lower in 1.28 pp (sig. 10%) in 
relation to its matched peers.  
Second, with exception CAPEX/Sales in PROA and PTA samples only (regressions 
(51) and (54) in Table 9 Panel A), all our regressions show sales growth, our proxy to 
investment opportunities, as statistical significant, and the majority of times at 1%.  
Third, and more important, Equation (3.2), as estimated and shown in Panel B, which 
allows us to develop and further build the results from equation (3.1) - it enables us to 
separate the explanatory variables by firm type -, seems to provide some evidence of a 
negative impact of PE intervention in investment.  
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Table 9 - Sensitivity to Investment Opportunities across PE and matched peers 
This table reports the estimation of, in Panel A Equation (3.1) adapted with a PE dummy, and in Panel B Equation (3.2) which allows the analysis of within-firm 
variation to differences in the sensitivity of investment intensity to investment opportunities (sales growth as proxy), and profitability, between PE firms and other 
private firms considered as the best “comparable” according to our two matching criteria. Each of the 5 Investment intensity measure is regressed in three ways (i) all 
firms, i.e., PE firms and peers matched by both methods (column “All” under each metric);(ii) PE firms and peers matched by ROA  (column “PE + PROA”)  and; (iii) 
PE firms and peers matched on TA  (column “PE+PTA”). For each sample two regressions are estimated to separate the impact of the PE entry: n-1 (Panel B needs to 
be n-1 to 0 in pre PE period to allow Company FE) vs. n+1 to n+3 periods. Cross section and year fixed effects (FE) are included. In Panel A the specification only 
allows for sector (4-digit Nace) FE, whilst in Panel B we are allowed to include company FE. The majority of equations have significant FE (Redundant Fixed Effects 
– Likelihood Ratio) - kept in all for consistency. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White diagonal) are shown in italics under the coefficient estimates. We 
use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Values are winsorised between 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles. 
 
CAPEX / Lag TA 
 




PE + PROA 
 




PE + PROA 
 
PE + PTA 
























Period n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
ROA Lag 0.1560 * 0.1033 ** 
 









































Sales g 0.1949 *** 0.0921 *** 
 
0.1117 ** 0.0915 *** 
 
0.2715 *** 0.0739 *** 
 
0.1909 *** 0.0829 *** 
 
0.1056 ** 0.0792 *** 
 


















































































































































F-statistic 1.8 *** 2.0 *** 
 
1.9 *** 1.8 *** 
 
2.0 *** 1.7 *** 
 
1.3 * 1.6 *** 
 
1.6 ** 1.4 ** 
 
1.5 ** 1.6 *** 
























Period n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 




























































































































































































Constant 0.0648 *** 0.0492 *** 
 
0.0731 *** 0.0466 *** 
 
0.0539 *** 0.0331 *** 
 
0.0220 * 0.0091 
  





























































2.1 *** 1.9 *** 
 
1.8 *** 2.1 *** 
 
1.5 *** 1.5 *** 
 
1.7 *** 1.5 *** 
 

























Sector (Panel A) / Company (Panel B) and Year Fixed Effects Included in all equations 
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Table 9 (Continued) 
Two alternative Investment intensity measures CAPEX and Expansionary CAPEX deflated with end-of-year rather than beginning-of-year Total Assets.   
 
CAPEX / TA 
 




PE + PROA 
 




PE + PROA 
 
PE + PTA 
























Period n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 n= 1 to 3 















































Sales g 0.1498 *** 0.0781 *** 
 
0.0995 *** 0.0766 *** 
 
0.2068 *** 0.0584 *** 
 
0.1487 *** 0.0830 *** 
 
0.0971 *** 0.0842 *** 
 























































































































































1.6 ** 1.6 *** 
 
1.7 *** 2.0 *** 
 
1.5 ** 1.9 *** 
 
1.9 *** 1.7 *** 
























Period n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
ROA -0.2277 * -0.2794 ** 
 






-0.2120 * -0.2739 ** 
 









































































































































































Constant 0.0399 *** 0.0237 *** 
 
0.0436 *** 0.0233 ** 
 
0.0280 * 0.0094 
  
0.0776 *** 0.0647 *** 
 
0.0786 *** 0.0615 *** 
 




















































F-statistic 1.5 *** 1.5 *** 
 
1.6 *** 1.6 *** 
 
1.4 ** 1.6 *** 
 
1.8 *** 1.9 *** 
 
2.0 *** 2.1 *** 
 






























Table 9 (Continued) 
Last alternative Investment intensity measure: CAPEX deflated with Sales.   
 




PE + PROA 
 
PE + PTA 












Period n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 n= 1 to 3 




0.6517 * -0.4733 *** 
 




























































Constant 0.5005 *** 0.3216 *** 
 
0.3805 ** 0.2940 ** 
 




























F-statistic 1.7 *** 2.9 *** 
 
1.4 * 2.7 *** 
 
1.8 *** 1.9 *** 












Period n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 
 
n= -1 to 0 n= 1 to 3 



































































































Constant 0.1053 ** 0.1437 *** 
 
































F-statistic 2.4 *** 2.4 *** 
 
2.2 *** 2.8 *** 
 













Sector (Panel A) / Company (Panel B) and Year Fixed Effects Included in all equations 
 
This impact can be seen in two ways. The first impact is seen in sensitivity to 
investment opportunities. When measured against peers matched on ROA, for all of the 
CAPEX intensity measures, after the PE entry, the firms become less sensitive to 
investment opportunities, as it can be seen by the negative sign of the coefficient which 
would add (subtract in this case) to the generic coefficient. Furthermore, in some cases 
the PE was more sensible than its peers before entry.   
For example, the CAPEX/Lag TA of a PE firm before PE entry would typically have a 
15.27 pp (0.1527) higher sensitivity to investment opportunities than its peers with 
similar ROA (regression 15), whilst after the entry, the value was 8.58 pp (-0.0858) 
lower (regression 16).  
Nevertheless, the results are not the same if we match firms based on size (TA) rather 
than ROA. This brings us to the question on what is the better matching alternative. We 
tend to consider ROA as the better matching alternative.  
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First, in the literature, a statistical significant relationship between ROA and investment 
intensity is systematically reported, and hence its inclusion in investment regressions 
even for authors agnostic to its interpretation (Asker et al., 2015). Size does not seem to 
have a similar impact in explaining investment policy. 
Second, we could match on ROA and TA. However as discussed under the 
Methodology section, besides the overmatching argument, our sample of private firms 
does not include sufficient companies to hold the threefold matching criteria. We’d end 
up with very different companies under one of the dimensions or would have to relax 
the level of industry matching.  
Furthermore, the first matching would impact the final result, and the second matching 
would only refine the results, which would eventually be different all the same, meaning 
that matching on TA and then ROA would probably result in different outcomes than 
matching on ROA and then TA. 
Third, despite the fact that both matching criteria result in non statistical differences in 
investment intensities with PE firms in selection year (n-1), the distribution in ROA 
firms seems less subjected to outliers and more centred (Figure 3). Additionally, the 
average difference in matching (under each criterion) seems smaller in ROA, meaning 
that we find on average more firms with a very similar ROA than firms with a very 
similar TA (under each sector).  
Finally, the sensitivity to investment opportunities (not the PE effect) is almost always 
statistically more significant in regressions made in a sample of PE and PROA firms 
than in samples of PE and PTA firms.  
Nonetheless, this is clearly a subject that would require additional research and probably 
deserves a separate research topic.  
The second evidence of a negative impact of PE in investment is given by the sensitivity 
to ROA.  
In this case, the impact is more or less consistent across the metrics and matching 
criteria, with the difference being that in PTA sample, the value is only significant when 
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CAPEX or expansionary CAPEX is measured against end-of-year assets (regressions 42 
and 48). 
The rather consensual result is that sensitivity to ROA, or in other words, the ICF 
sensitivity, increases and is positive and statistically significant for PE firms after the 
entry.  
Despite divergence on the interpretation towards the ICF, we recall our literature 
review, namely Bertoni et al. (2013), who stated that the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
critique is about the monotonicity not about its sign, meaning that the ICF sensitivity 
should not be a measure of the degree of financial constraints but a sign of its existence. 
Hence, non-financially constrained firms should have an ICF not statistically different 
from zero but financially constrained firms, would have positive and significant ICF 
sensitivities.  
This is precisely our case. The only statistically significant positive sensitivities to 
ROA, in our sample/regressions, are the ones regarding PE firms.  
In fact, we saw a significant increase in leverage towards PROA firms. By year 3, the 
average difference in PE firms Debt/EBITDA to the Sector median was 5.8x whilst the 
same difference in the sample of firms matched on ROA was 2.8x.  
All in all, the results seem to indicate the existence of financial constraints in PE backed 
firms, which appear only after entry, that end up underinvesting its comparable peers.  
This seems consistent with Ughetto (2014) findings.  
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5. The Public vs. Private discussion  
5.1 The discussion and relevance for our analysis 
Is there a difference in investment policies between public and private firms, or, in other 
words, does the listing status impact a firm investment intensity? 
As we saw in our literature review, the theoretical answer to this question is not 
consensual. Whilst according to the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), on the 
back of agency related issues one would expect public firms to overinvest in relation to 
similar private firms; Stein (1988), however, offers a different view, arguing that the 
public firm focus on short term results, which often leads to myopically cuts in 
investment, sacrificing long term objectives due to short term pressures. 
This, as we saw, is relevant for our analysis as the implicit or explicit explanation for a 
majority of the observed reduction in investment after a going private, or otherwise PE 
intervention in general, is that it simply results from a correction in overinvestment.  
As we mentioned previously, very recently Asker et al. (2015) showed empirical 
evidence in support of Stein (1988) arguments, for the US.  
5.2 Empirical Findings 
We envisaged presenting a high level comparison for Europe and thus we did a similar, 
albeit much less extensive, approach to Asker et al. (2015)
1
.  
We present in Table 10 the results for the unconditional investment intensities, as 
measured by CAPEX / Lagged total assets, for the 9 years from 2005 to 2013.  
                                                             
1 Please bear in mind that this approach is mainly related to our PE deals sample and, thus, the public-
private sample encompasses only the sectors analysed in our main study and not the whole economy. 
Nevertheless, we seem to have a representative sample of the European economy, given we have 76 
different Nace 4-digit sectors, encompassing all the 1 digit codes and the fact that our sample of 29,435 
companies, represents €3.3tn in assets and €2.4tn sales (2013), which compares with the Euro-28 €13.9tn 
GDP in 2014. As discussed in methodology, we envisaged a stable sample, meaning the same set of firms 
throughout the analysis period. Hence we discarded all the companies lacking any of our main financials 
during any year of the analysed period. Between lacking some or all the financials, from a starting almost 
400 thousand companies, we ended up with a sample of 29 thousand companies, before matching, as 




Table 10 - Unconditional Investment Intensities 
This table reports unconditional investment intensities for public and private firms per year, in 
four samples: all, unmatched, and three matched on Nace 4-digit code and total assets, ROA and 
total assets plus ROA, respectively. Significance tests for the difference between public and 
private samples given Anova F-Test and the two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum for means and 
medians, respectively. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
(two-sided), respectively. Values are winsorised between 0.005 and 0.995 percentiles to reduce 
the impact of outliers. We use 0.5% in each tail rather than 5% as previously as the outliers carry 
less weight given the size of the samples and to compare with Asker et al. (2015).  For the cases 
where there is a statistically significant difference, we highlight in bold the higher value. 
CAPEX / Lag TA Nº Firms 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
MEANS 
All Sample 
          Private 17,803 0.0829 0.0800 0.0693 0.1225 0.0521 0.0641 0.0515 0.0461 0.0363 
Public 11,632 0.0917 0.0854 0.0840 0.1272 0.0564 0.0583 0.0534 0.0483 0.0423 
All 29,435 0.0863 0.0821 0.0751 0.1244 0.0564 0.0618 0.0522 0.0470 0.0387 
Difference 
 
*** *** *** 
  
*** * ** *** 
Matched on TA 
          Private 9,306 0.1037 0.0892 0.0705 0.1345 0.0623 0.0690 0.0551 0.0502 0.0391 
Public 9,306 0.0917 0.0899 0.0873 0.1409 0.0588 0.0619 0.0571 0.0505 0.0443 










Matched on ROA 
          Private 9,596 0.0989 0.0955 0.0829 0.1757 0.0687 0.0719 0.0608 0.0536 0.0423 
Public 9,596 0.0905 0.0837 0.0831 0.1345 0.0562 0.0590 0.0536 0.0492 0.0433 





*** *** *** *** *** 
 
Matched on TA & ROA 
         Private 8,393 0.102 0.0903 0.0704 0.1313 0.0626 0.0700 0.0561 0.0498 0.0395 
Public 8,393 0.0867 0.0865 0.0850 0.1415 0.0575 0.0615 0.0566 0.0501 0.0432 










          Private 17,803 0.0343 0.0363 0.0292 0.0317 0.0244 0.0281 0.0221 0.0199 0.0136 
Public 11,632 0.0371 0.0341 0.0346 0.0391 0.0224 0.0252 0.0235 0.0213 0.0186 
All 29,435 0.0355 0.0355 0.0313 0.0349 0.0235 0.0270 0.0226 0.0206 0.0156 
Difference 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** 
  
*** 
Matched on TA 
          Private 9,306 0.0364 0.0376 0.0281 0.0283 0.0257 0.0300 0.0232 0.0222 0.0148 
Public 9,306 0.0368 0.0345 0.0348 0.0395 0.0224 0.0254 0.0235 0.0216 0.0187 
All 18,612 0.0366 0.0361 0.0313 0.0342 0.0240 0.0276 0.0235 0.0219 0.0169 
Difference 
  
*** *** *** *** *** 
  
*** 
Matched on ROA 
          Private 9,596 0.0358 0.0387 0.0313 0.0327 0.0263 0.0304 0.0237 0.0221 0.0155 
Public 9,596 0.0380 0.0350 0.0354 0.0405 0.0228 0.0255 0.0238 0.0214 0.0189 
All 19,192 0.0368 0.0369 0.0334 0.0368 0.0245 0.0278 0.0238 0.0217 0.0171 
Difference 
 
** *** *** *** *** *** 
  
*** 
Matched on TA & ROA 
         Private 8,393 0.0368 0.0387 0.0286 0.0290 0.0265 0.0309 0.0242 0.0231 0.0154 
Public 8,393 0.0366 0.0347 0.0350 0.0401 0.0223 0.0255 0.0237 0.0216 0.0186 
All 16,786 0.0367 0.0367 0.0316 0.0348 0.0243 0.0279 0.0239 0.0223 0.0170 
Difference 
  






The whole sample, unmatched, shows that public firms, on average, invest more than 
private firms. This happens in 6 out of the 9 years of the sample. In 2008/9 there is no 
(significant) difference and in 2010 private firms invest more.  
Samples matched on TA and TA & ROA
2
 show broadly inconclusive results, as there as 
many years where public firms invest more as the other way around.  
Again, like in our PE sample, here matching on ROA also shows a different story, in 
this case, that in the majority of years private firms invest more than public firms (7 out 
of 9, always significant at 1%) and there is no year where the public firms invest 
significantly more than their private counterparts (in mean terms).   
Curiously, all the samples show a very similar story in median terms: before the crisis, 
in 2006 private firms invested more, then in 2007/08 public firms invest more than 
private firms, and then in the two following years the situation reverts again (at least 
temporarily).  
This evolution is basically conditioned by the quick fall in investment intensity in 
private firms as public firms seem rather unaffected by the crisis, at least in its early 
years (public firm’s investment also reduces but only 2 years after private peers, in 
2009). This is consistent with the view public firms have broader access to capital 
(equity and debt) markets, whilst private firms are much more dependent on the banking 
sector for external financing, which, as it is common knowledge, was severely halted in 
the wake of the financial crisis.   
As shown in Table 11, Panel A (estimation of equation 3.1), holding investment 
opportunities (sales growth as proxy) and profitability constant for the whole period, the 
sample matched on ROA shows that public firms invest less than their private 
counterparts, which is consistent Asker et al. (2015) conclusions. Typically, a public 
firm investment intensity would be 0.6 pp less (-0.0061) than the private counterpart, 
with the same profitability and investment opportunities.  
                                                             
2 Unlike with our PE sample, here we can perform a matching on TA and ROA (much larger sample). 
However, given the fact that the matching first occurs on TA and then on ROA, the results are 
undoubtedly conditioned by the first step and the second step is nothing more than refining the first one. 




Table 11 - Conditional Investment Intensities 
This table reports the estimation of Equation (3.1) in Panel A and Equation (3.2) in Panel B. Whilst Equation (3.1) isolates the public listing status, Equation (3.2) 
and allows the analysis of within-firm variation to differences in the sensitivity of investment intensity to investment opportunities, with sales growth as proxy, and 
profitability, between public and private. We estimate the regression of investment intensity as measured by CAPEX / Lagged total assets in three matched samples 
and for 4 estimation periods, the whole period, 2005/06 as “pre-crisis” period, 2007/10 as “crisis period” and 2011/13 as the “port crisis". In Panel A the regressions 
include Sector (Nace 4-digit code) and year fixed effects as the specification does not allow for company fixed effects. In Panel B company and year fixed effects 
are included. Fixed Effects test given by Redundant Fixed Effects – Likelihood Ratio. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White diagonal) are shown in 
italics under the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Values are winsorised 
between 0.005 and 0.995 percentiles (as in Asker et al. (2015)).  
 
Matched on Sector & ROA 
 
Matched on Sector & Total Assets 
 
Matched on Sector & Total Assets & ROA 
Period 2005 - 2013 2005-2006 2007-2010 2011-2013 
 
2005 - 2013 2005-2006 2007-2010 2011-2013 
 
2005 - 2013 2005-2006 2007-2010 2011-2013 
Obs. 172,695 38,372 76,756 57,567 
 
167,439 37,197 74,423 55,819 
 
151,049 33,565 67,136 50,348 
Companies 19,192 19,191 19,192 19,192 
 
18,612 18,612 18,611 18,611 
 
16,786 16,786 16,786 16,786 
PANEL A 






































 ROA Lag  0.1932 *** 0.2402 *** 0.1821 *** 0.1792 *** 0.1507 *** 0.1476 *** 0.1498 *** 0.1632 *** 
 

























 Sales g 0.0711 *** 0.0773 *** 0.0767 *** 0.0554 *** 0.0685 *** 0.0792 *** 0.0719 *** 0.0490 *** 
 


















































 Sector and Year FE: Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** 























 F-statistic 174.0 *** 44.8 *** 78.8 *** 51.8 *** 157.6 *** 40.3 *** 70.0 *** 47.2 *** 150.9 *** 39.2 *** 66.8 *** 45.9 *** 
PANEL B  

























 x Public -0.0849 *** -0.0540 
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0.0163 * 0.0022 
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This holds out through the subsamples we’ve created for the “pre-crisis” (2005/6), 
“crisis” (2007/10) and “post-crisis” (2011/13) periods. Curiously, the difference in 
public firms towards private peers increases in the “crisis” period (-0.89 pp).  
However, matching both on TA and TA&ROA shows no statistically significant 
difference for the public vs. private companies in the whole period, after controlling for 
investment opportunities and profitability.  
Nonetheless, looking to the subsamples, we can see that in the pre-crisis period, there 
was a difference, which was consistent with the sample matched on ROA, i.e., the 
public firms invest less than their private peers and the value is quite similar across the 
three matching criteria. 
With the crisis, and after it, the difference disappears. This could signal both that the 
impact of the crisis was still present in our otherwise classified as “post-crisis” period 
(in fact if we consider it just as one period the results are the same), or that there was a 
change in the investment structure across firms.  
Albeit this would require further investigation, out of the scope in this study, this can 
relate to the aforementioned dependency of European private firms to banking 
financing, unlike their US counterparts, much more relying on capital markets. 
This also seems consistent with the results from Equation (3.2) as reported in Table 11, 
Panel B, which as we referred, splits the “public effect” of equation (3.1), as seen in 
Panel A, between the profitability/cash-flow and investment opportunities explanatory 
variables.  
Although with some differences in sub periods, for the whole period analysed, all three 
matching criteria output the a consistent idea, which is that the impact of the public 
listing status is basically due to the lower ICF sensitivity as, unlike Asker et al. (2015), 
if any, the difference in sensitivity to investment opportunities is higher in public firms. 
For instance, in a sample of matched peers on sector and TA, the public firm sensitivity 
to investment opportunities, for the whole period (2005/13), was 0.0625 
(0.0504+0.0121) whilst the private firm was 0.0504. This compares with the 0.028 and 
0.118, respectively estimated by Asker et al. (2015) for the US in the 2002/11 period. 
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Looking at sub periods, it seems that the same outcome in the ROA and in the TA 
matching samples have different origins, as the difference in investment opportunities 
seems to arise from the “crisis” period in the former and in the “post-crisis” in the latter.  
The sample matched by TA&ROA produces no difference in investment opportunities 
across public or private firms.  
Although subjected to discussion, the lower ICF sensitivity in public firms seems 
consistent with the fact that, at least in the “pre-crisis” period, public firms did invest 
less than private firms and that with the “crisis”, private firms reduce more their 
investment. 
If private firms are more dependent on the banking sector for financing and have less 
access to capital markets, then it’s plausible that they can be more dependent on cash-
flow to finance its investments. And in fact, with the profitability/cash-flow plunge 
during the crisis, private firms’ investment is severely affected whilst public firms’ is 
not, or, at least, is highly lagged (2 years).  We do not show these values, but to 
illustrate, the mean private (public) ROA Lag was 13.3% (12.2%) in 2007 and falls to 
10% (9%) in 2009.  
European firms have historically been more dependent on banking, which can also 
explain some of the differences to the US. In fact, a special report from FitchRatings 
(2013) shows an increase of the bond weight in European corporate funding from a 17% 
in 2005 to 52% in 2013 (1H). One of the reasons presented is the banking deleveraging 
trend, on the back of regulatory pressures (e.g. Basel III). Nonetheless, despite the 
evolution, European firms are still long way until the typical American capital structure 
where bonds represent [70-80]% of the whole debt. 
All-in-all, our results show higher sensitivity to ROA than to investment opportunities, 





6. Conclusions  
Only recently the overinvestment correction (Jensen, 1986), as an explanation for the 
evidence that CAPEX falls after the PE entry, started to be questioned, with Sousa and 
Jenkinson (2013), Bharath et al. (2014) and Ughetto (2014) concluding that evidence is, 
at least, not supportive of that hypothesis, and Asker et al. (2015) showing that in US 
public firms invest less and are less sensitive to changes in investment opportunities 
than private firms. 
Our research goal was twofold: first assess the impact of PE entry in European 
companies, in recent years, and second, try to compare the investment policies of public 
and private firms, in order to briefly compare to Asker et al. (2015) results for US with 
European data, and verify empirically the question of public firm overinvestment  
(Jensen, 1986) or underinvestment (Stein, 1988) thesis. Both goals are related, as the 
common explanation for the investment intensity reduction after the buyout is exactly 
the correction of an overinvestment.  
Using Zephyr and Amadeus databases, we have collected a sample of 92 PE entry deals 
in Europe-28, between 2006 and 2010, and a sample of c. 29 thousand European 
companies (c. 11 thousand public and 18 thousand private) and tried to answer to the 
questions: How do investments evolve after the PE entry a what can we conclude from 
that evolution after controlling matched peers and for the variables that according to the 
empirical investment literature explain the investment intensity? Do European public 
firms overinvest their private comparables? 
Using the Kaplan (1989) approach we’ve compared the pre-entry (n-1) with the post 
entry (n+1 to n+3) investment levels and found some evidence that PE firms invest 
statistically significant less than their peers, in a period marked by the crisis and where 
there was a generic trend (sector medians) to reduce investment intensity. 
However, this trend is not consistent across different matching criteria and appears only 
when ROA (after sector) is our matching criteria.  
Controlling for the investment intensity standard explainable variables, found in the 
empirical investment literature, and following Asker et al. (2015) methodology, we 
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found some evidence that only PE firms exhibit positive significant ICF sensitivity. This  
results, consistent with Ughetto (2014), seem to indicate the existence of financial 
constraints in PE backed firms. 
The literature critiques on the ICF sensitivity interpretation relate to the fact that it 
should not be considered a measure of the degree of financial constraints but a sign of 
its existence: financially constrained firms would have positive and significant ICF 
sensitivities (Bertoni et al., 2013).  
We also found some evidence that after the PE entry, firms become less sensitive to 
investment opportunities, with sales growth as proxy, which unlike the ICF, is 
dependent on the matching criteria, in the case, only occurring when peers are matched 
by ROA. Despite acknowledging that the question can be debatable, and would require 
further investigation, we present some arguments that support ROA rather than total 
assets as matching criteria.  
Finally we’ve compared public to private firms in Europe during the last 10 years.   
We found some evidence that private firms invested more than their public counterparts 
before and, under some criteria/matching did it again after the crisis, even if temporarily 
in some cases. The convergence, during the early crisis years, was caused by significant 
fall in investment in private firms and not by an increase in public firms (which lag the 
private counterparts drop by 2 years).  
At the same time, we found lower ICF sensitivity in public firms, which seems 
consistent with the fact that, with the initial stage (2007/08) of the “crisis”, private firms 
reduce their investment whilst public firms did not. If private firms are more dependent 
on banking financing and have less access to capital markets, then it’s plausible that 
they can be more dependent on cash-flow to finance their investments.  
Although with some differences in sub periods, for the whole period analysed, all three 
matching criteria output the same consistent idea, which is that the impact of the public 
listing status – it reduces, at least before the crisis, the investment intensity - is basically 
due to the lower ICF sensitivity as, unlike Asker et al. (2015), if any, the difference in 
sensitivity to investment opportunities is higher in public firms. 
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In a nutshell, we find some evidence, even though limited, that PE impact negatively 
firms investment policies due to a mix of increased financial constraints and probably to 
lower sensitivity to investment opportunities. In any case, we found stronger evidence 
that the overinvestment correction is hardly a valid explanation, as public firms, at least 
before the crisis, invested less than their private counterparts.   
This research has some limitations. The concentration of deals in the “crisis” period 
seems to considerably “taint” our sample, the ultimate example being the fact that 
unlike any other research we found no evidence of profitability increase after the entry 
(by n+3). In fact, the period is marked by a significant generalized reduction in 
investment and profitability, which can to some extent “mask” the PE firm behaviour. 
Furthermore, our sample of public and private firms, albeit significantly larger than in 
Asker et al. (2015), does not encompass all the sectors nor European countries.   
This research leaves several topics for future research, namely: the development of our 
PE sample, in order to be possible to isolate the “crisis” effect; the analysis of the exit 
(we were not able to pursue due to the lack of deals with data); a deeper insight on what 
matching criteria produces better and more consistent results, under more “normalized” 
economic circumstances; the enlarging of the public/private sample to the whole set of 
sector codes, the countries influence, as well as a deeper investigation on the differences 
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Appendix I  
Table 12 - Main Studies addressing CAPEX impact on PE backed firms 
Author/Year 
of study 
Sample Findings  




76 US MBOs 
between 1980-86 
CAPEX falls in all 3 years after buyout 
although not statistically significant. 
Industry adjusted reductions are larger 
and significant. 
Suggests that indirect evidence given by 
the fact that market adjusted returns to 
post-buyout investors is large and 
significant points to the overinvestment 
hypothesis. 
Smith (1990) 58 US MBOs 
between 1977-86 
CAPEX significantly falls after buyout. 
CAPEX to Sales also decreases but is 







72 RLBOs from 
1983-87 of LBOs 
occurred  1976-86 
RLBO has CAPEX/Sales lower than 
industry and experienced a decrease in 
the relative level of CAPEX under 
private ownership. Decline is most 






90 RLBOs from 
1983-88 of LBOs 
occurred 1976-87 
Pre IPO LBOs have lower CAPEX than 
industry but the difference disappears 
after the IPO, as RLBOs increase 
CAPEX. 
Authors refer to the fact that the increase 
in CAPEX in RLBOs is consistent with 
the fact that these firms being cash 
constrained prior to the RLBO. 
Boucly et al. 
(2011) 
839 French LBOs 
over 1994–2004 
CAPEX increased relatively to control 
groups.  
Increase in CAPEX is concentrated in 
Private to Private deals - evidence of 
existing financial constraints. In the sub 
sample of Public to Private, CAPEX 
reduces, but the difference to control 
groups is not statistically significant.    
(Chung, 
2011) 
1,009 UK buyouts 
from 1997 to 2006  
Suggests that PE attempts to reorganize 
target firms in a way which reduces 
inherent the targets‘ inefficiencies— 
agency problems in public targets and 
investment constraints in private ones 
Suggests that public targets suffered 
from agency whilst private targets from 
financial constraints - overinvestment 




PE exits: 345 
SBOs and 117 
IPOs between 
2000-07 
IPO firms increase CAPEX much more 
than SBOs 
As IPO firms outperform market 
substantially it is hard to believe that 
they can do that while overinvesting. 
Thus the underinvestment hypothesis 
seems, indirectly, more plausible. 
Bertoni et al. 
(2013) 
324 Private 
Spanish firms that 
were subject to a 
VC and PE 
Investment period 
1995–04 
VC: reduction in the investment 
dependency on internal cash flows in 
SMEs in expansion stage after VC deal 
PE (buyouts): did not find a significant 
sensitivity before, whereas a positive 
value is found after the acquisition. 
Mentioned that firms in which leverage 
increased to finance the acquisition, 
investments will be constrained to the 
internally generated funds. Investment 




2239 PE backed 
SMEs in UK and 
France spanning 
from 1998-2007 
CAPEX increases and Financial 
constraints decrease with the PE 
intervention 
Reduction of ICF sensitivities could be 
reduction in overinvestment. However, 
effects of PE are much higher for smaller 
firms - more likely to face financial 
constraints and less likely to suffer 
overinvestment.  




plant level data 
Investment and Capital decrease after 
going private. 
Overinvestment interpretation is not 
consistent with productivity not 
changing in relation to control groups. 
Ughetto 
(2014) 
206 low-med tech 
firms, o/w 108 
(private to private) 
buyouts 1997-04 
in FR, UK, IT and 
SP 
ICF Sensitivity rises with buyout. No 
signf. impact of buyouts on the 
investment rates in the post-buyout. 
However, results show a decrease in the 
Investment of UK firms and an increase 
in the investment rates French firms. 
PE contributes to raising target firms’ 
financing constraints and adversely 
affect firms’ investment rates - more 
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For i = 2 To 77 
Sheets("Sector").Select 




Selection.AutoFilter field:=2, Criteria1:=sector 
Range("b2").CurrentRegion.Copy 
Sheets("private").Range("a1").PasteSpecial 





Selection.AutoFilter field:=2, Criteria1:=sector 
Range("b2").CurrentRegion.Copy 
Sheets("Public").Range("a1").PasteSpecial 









Dim linhaspublic As Integer 
linhaspublic = Range("A1048576").End(xlUp).Row 
Sheets("Private").Select 
Dim linhasprivate As Integer 
linhasprivate = Range("A1048576").End(xlUp).Row 
If linhaspublic >= linhasprivate Then 
janela1 = "Private" 
janela2 = "Public" 
Else 
janela1 = "Public" 
janela2 = "Private" 
End If 
Sheets(janela1).Select 
Do While Range("a2") <> "" 
Sheets(janela1).Select 
If Range("a2") <> "" Then 
Rows("2:2").Select 










linha = Range("A1048576").End(xlUp).Row 
Sheets(janela2).Select 
Range("Db1") = "asset ratio" 
ultimalinha = Range("A1048576").End(xlUp).Row 
For i = 2 To ultimalinha 
If Sheets("Match").Range("f" & linha) > Sheets(janela2).Range("f" & i) Then 
Range("db" & i) = Sheets("Match").Range("f" & linha) / Sheets(janela2).Range("f" & i) 
Else 
Range("db" & i) = Sheets(janela2).Range("f" & i) / Sheets("Match").Range("f" & linha) 
End If 
Next 
Range("A2", "db" & ultimalinha).Select 
Selection.Sort key1:=Range("db1"), Order1:=xlAscending 
If Range("db2") < 2 Then 
Rows("2:2").Select 






















For matching on ROA the approach was the same, with exception of the calliper based 
criteria, in which we substitute the ratio between the max. (TA) / min. (TA) < 2 (the part 
in bold) with forcing the difference between ROA’s to be less than 2x the min. (ROA): 
 
VBA coding adjustment (replace part in bold) for Matching on ROA: 
 
If Sheets("Match").Range("f" & linha) > Sheets(janela2).Range("f" & i) Then 
Range("db" & i) = Abs(Sheets("Match").Range("f" & linha) - Sheets(janela2).Range("f" & i)) 
Else 
Range("db" & i) = Abs(Sheets(janela2).Range("f" & i) - Sheets("Match").Range("f" & linha)) 
End If 
Next 
Range("A2", "db" & ultimalinha).Select 
Selection.Sort key1:=Range("db1"), Order1:=xlAscending 
If Range("db2") < 2 * WorksheetFunction.Min(Sheets(janela2).Range("f" & i), 




Table 13 - Public and Private firms per Country/Legal Form 
This Table reports the country and legal form breakdown of our sample of 
public and private companies, before and after each matching procedure.  
Country ISO / Legal Form All 
Matched on NACE 4-digit plus:  
TA ROA TA & ROA 
AT 22 20 19 19 
Private 22 20 19 19 
BE 836 626 657 574 
Private 67 59 41 49 
Public 769 567 616 525 
BG 158 97 108 83 
Private 101 46 60 39 
Public 57 51 48 44 
CZ 449 310 313 277 
Private 302 188 192 170 
Public 147 122 121 107 
DE 461 375 307 336 
Private 355 294 219 264 
Public 106 81 88 72 
ES 1,411 1,015 1,099 947 
Private 518 451 377 423 
Public 893 564 722 524 
FI 415 258 265 240 
Private 387 240 242 223 
Public 28 18 23 17 
FR 8,375 5,861 6,005 5,195 
Private 2,906 1,260 1,520 1,118 
Public 5,469 4,601 4,485 4,077 
GB 1,172 946 760 826 
Private 1,029 856 652 748 
Public 143 90 108 78 
GR 854 730 726 667 
Private 20 11 11 10 
Public 834 719 715 657 
HU 68 49 44 42 
Private 67 49 44 42 
IE 1 
   Public 1 
   IT 12,444 6,591 7,186 6,001 
Private 9,566 4,326 4,751 3,911 
Public 2,878 2,265 2,435 2,090 
LV 6 5 4 5 
Private 4 4 3 4 
Public 2 1 1 1 
PL 183 144 137 132 
Private 144 114 106 105 
Public 39 30 31 27 
PT 173 124 127 113 
Private 25 23 20 22 
Public 148 101 107 91 
SE 2,176 1,311 1,266 1,192 
Private 2,133 1,277 1,235 1,165 
Public 43 34 31 27 
SK 233 150 169 137 
Private 158 88 104 81 
Public 75 62 65 56 
Total  29,437 18,612 19,192 16,786 
 
